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The response to active shooter attacks is not as effective as it could be. People die 
before receiving care because most jurisdictions have a policy in place that stipulates 
emergency medical services (EMS) wait to enter a scene until law enforcement (LE) 
announces that the scene is clear or secure. Since this can take some time, life-saving care 
is not immediately available to the people who most need it, and consequently, there can 
be a greater loss of life. How can a combined LE and EMS response, based on combat 
medical care, be effective in saving lives during an active shooter incident?  
Utilizing 10 historic active shooter cases ranging from the Texas tower shooting 
in 1966 and concluding with the Sandy Hook school shooting in 2012, I analyzed the 
responses to consider the response times of the responders, time of access to the victims, 
and transport time to medical facilities. The basis for the responses utilized data collected 
by the U.S. military from combat injuries sustained from World War II through the 
current conflicts in the Middle East. From these analyses, I am able to show that fast field 
intervention based on training, policy, and operational planning with the Incident 
Command System component, which includes both law enforcement and fire/EMS entry 
teams, will provide better patient viability prior to hospital care. 
This will not be a critique of right and wrong, as the responders did what was 
needed at the time; however, in current-day hindsight, there are points that can be noted 
for future response growth.   
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “… an 
individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and 
populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or 
method to their selection of victims.”1 The various events occurring around the country 
that involves active shooters continues to force the responder community to evaluate and 
re-evaluate their responses to these incidents. Gone is the absolute process of “plausible 
reasoning,” which is explained by Jones as “leaping to a conclusion that is ‘probably’ 
correct based on the recognition of similarities between the situation confronting us at the 
moment and one that confronted us in the past.”2  
Law enforcement (LE) continues to be the primary responder to active shooter 
calls due to the potentially violent nature of these calls. In an emergency, the law 
enforcement component is followed on almost simultaneously by the fire/ emergency 
medical services (EMS) component. While this operational response is successful based 
on the separation of the responder entities, it is not sufficient for the victims of the 
incident if there is an opportunity to provide a joint entry response that initiates the 
assault on the shooter(s) and begins the triage portion for the victims. Depending on the 
size of the jurisdiction, response to such an incident may require only that jurisdiction’s 
assets to respond. However, history shows that multiple jurisdictions respond to active 
shooter incidents with law enforcement, fire/EMS, and command personnel. Our question 
is how do we utilize these responders to the best of their abilities and to the benefit of the 
victims?  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can a combined LE and EMS response, based on combat medical care, be 
effective in saving lives during an active shooter incident?  
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf.  
2 Morgan Jones, The Thinkers Toolkit (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1998).  
2 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The response to active shooter attacks is not as effective as it could be. People die 
before receiving care because most jurisdictions have a policy where EMS wait until LE 
clears the scene, and, since this can take some time, life-saving care is not available to the 
people who most need it. Consequently, there is greater loss of life.  
There is has been much written concerning the planning for and response to these 
events to contain and eliminate the threats(s). Additionally, there has been a great deal of 
forensic examination of these incidents or what Paul Mullen calls “autogenic massacres,” 
which is explained as “victims may be selected largely at random … essentially self-
generated (by the perpetrator). 3  Mullen’s use of the term “random” is explained as  
“where the perpetrators indiscriminately kill people in pursuit of a highly personal agenda 
arising from their own specific social situation and psychopathology.”4 There are several 
issues to explore: what can and should be considered while the operation is ongoing; 
what additional actions can law enforcement take in the “warm-zone” that has been 
cleared; what actions can law enforcement take when the attackers have been isolated by 
responding forces. Additionally, what can the emergency medical service be doing while 
the action is still ongoing? The research shows that a paradigm shift in both disciplines is 
taking place across the country, albeit slowly. For example, there is now a merging many 
of the existing training courses for law enforcement with EMS for combined responses to 
active shooter incidents. This singular development by the respective disciplines is 
moving toward a consensus that merging the responses is a better way of performing. The 
analysis of this impending merger in some locations and the existing merger in other 
locations speaks to a basic focus of appreciative inquiry: “It is assumed that a basic level 
of normal function exists in any organization, and that the potential—or capacity—for 
exceptional performance is already embedded within the organization.”5 
                                                 
3 Paul E. Mullen, “The Autogenic (Self-Generated) Massacre,” Behavioral Science and Law 22, 3 
(2004): 312.  
4 Ibid., 312.  
5 Frank J. Barrett, and Ronald E. Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building 
Cooperative Capacity (Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications, 2005), 19.  
3 
Of necessity, the planning and policy concept also utilizes the tenants of a unified 
command. Both LE and EMS are trained together to act as a cohesive unit to address the 
shooter as well as the victims. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as 
national and local instruction facilities, are beginning to incorporate a medical aspect to 
the LE response.  
A number of training sites and programs under development are addressed in the 
thesis. The Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) program 
from Texas, the 3 ECHO (entry, evaluate, and evacuate) response in Minneapolis, and the 
Arlington County, Virginia response plan are some of the response plans that are 
currently in use. Research based on historic incidents shows there is a need to develop 
more fully the training of officers responding in the second or third wave to better escort 
and protect the arriving EMS personnel who need to begin medical tasks. This would 
allow EMS to begin to address life saving measures for those who appear to have non-
fatal injuries. Additionally, this thesis examines the use of an incident command structure 
(ICS) in past incidents to determine the feasibility of its use to coordinate exterior 
operations in the “warm” zones wherein immediate medical triage and treatment could 
begin while the operation is still ongoing. A greater understanding of the four main 
disciplines, police, emergency medicine, military combat operations and field medical 
support coalesce into a guide for a unified command structure under ICS and aid future 
planning for the civilian first responders at active shooter scenes. 
 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
As the research for this paper grew, it substantiated on important theory—that this 
was in fact a “confirmatory” test. There was no doubt that faster access to victims of 
active shooters, or for that matter any mass casualty incident, would lead to a greater 
survival rate. In essence, this indicated that this is an “a prioi hypothesis,” that is the 
outcome is already known. What is significant is that the creation of a program that 
combines the capabilities of the responders, both law enforcement and fire/EMS, is one 
of critical importance for a successful intervention and rescue of the injured. The abilities 
4 
of the various disciplines are ones of functionality. Each discipline is a complex system 
exclusive to itself yet interdependent with other complex systems (disciplines) to function 
fully, much like a racecar components or the human body. 
D. METHOD 
The method of research for this thesis will be a mix of the following:  
• Case studies of 10 historical events involving active shooters. In each 
case, the time of access to the patients/injured victims as well as the time 
of transportation is important. Both access and transportation are due to 
actions or inactions of the law enforcement responders. Timeliness of 
wound care and treatment based on studies from the military are important 
consideration.  
• Discipline specific studies, reports, and published articles as well as theses 
and published books, which provide historic information, best practices 
and lessons learned.  
• I will rely upon my career history (introduced later) in an action research 
to explain portions of incident response issues that he has observed in a 
pseudo “naturalistic observation” capacity.  
 
5 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis began with the idea of providing faster medical assistance to the 
injured in an active shooter incident. In order to look at this, it is necessary to review 
select historic incidents that had some impact on the growth of the law enforcement and 
fire/EMS communities with regard to the response to these type incidents. As part of the 
methodology, requests were sent to a number of cities and counties to determine the 
impact that past events have had on them and to determine if they had policies for active 
shooter events for both fire and law enforcement. 
A portion of the research was a formal request to 60 mid-sized cities or counties 
for both law enforcement and fire/EMS policies concerning active shooter response plans 
and procedures. The clerk of the specific city or county jurisdiction was requested to 
provide specific information directly or forward the request to the respective law 
enforcement or fire/EMS agency. The request consisted of three simple statements and a 
request for any policies if the agency had an active shooter policy in place: 
 
I am requesting answers from both police as well as fire/EMS to the 
following questions:  
1. The department does / does not have an active shooter policy;  
2. The policy is a standalone active shooter policy or;  
3. It is combined with a general crisis response policy.  
If you have any policy, please send an electronic copy to me at the above 
email address. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the thought picture that forms the nucleus for subject-matter 
writings that reviewed for this thesis. The use of existing writings from different 
responder organizations, past educational writings, and literature specific to incidents, 
practices, or studies provided a foundation for study and analysis of the active shooter 
history, response procedures, both historic and current as well as proposed. 
6 
 Thesis thought picture Figure 1. 
 
 
This thesis includes a qualitative analysis that uses various policy models, such as 
from guidelines from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the 
National Fire Academy. It also includes is a review of information from various federal 
agencies and existing policies concerning active shooter responses by both law 
enforcement and fire/EMS to examine practices and lessons learned from the various 
agencies.  
As law enforcement and the medical disciplines develop specific concepts with 
some currently in place separately, I used an appreciative inquiry approach to 
demonstrate the procedures are currently used by each discipline that have proven to be 
effective. As defined in Barrett and Fry, “Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a strength-based, 
capacity building approach to transforming human systems toward a shared image of 
their most positive potential by first discovering the very best in their shared 
experience.”6 It is a given that law enforcement agencies have a policy for use of force in 
                                                 

















incidents and that fire/EMS have a policy or procedure for, at minimum, mass casualty 
events, if not specifically for active shooter incidents. 
As I write in this Emic style (“relating to or denoting an approach to the study or 
description of a particular language or culture in terms of its internal elements and their 
functioning rather than in terms of any existing external scheme”7), I am aware of this 
and refer the readers to a portion of the book, The Action Research Dissertation: A Guide 
for Students and Faculty, written by Kerr and Anderson:  
This type of self-reflective action research is always written up in the first 
person. Evans’s (1995) narrative has characteristics of a story, with 
elements of humor and irony and a narrative hook that leads the reader 
into wanting to read more. Practitioners tend to use narrative and story as a 
way to communicate professional knowledge, which makes it particularly 
appropriate for action research.8 
However, it raises epistemological problems in the sense that unexamined, 
tacit knowledge of a site tends to be impressionistic, full of bias, prejudice, 
and unexamined impressions and assumptions that need to be surfaced and 
examined. Furthermore, insiders, because they are often true believers in 
their particular practices, are too often tempted to put a positive spin on 
their data. For this reason, mechanisms for dealing with bias need to be 
employed.9 
My advisors have cautioned me that personal involvement as I have incorporated it can 
hold limited validity.  
By way of introduction, I served eleven years in the United States Army from 
1972 to 1975 and returned to service from 1976 to 1984. I achieved the position of 
assistant platoon sergeant and the rank of staff sergeant. Eight of those years were as a 
military police officer and five of those years were with the 82d Airborne Division as a 
member of the military police company. I also spent 29 and a half years as a civilian law 
enforcement officer from 1984 to 2014 in the state of Florida. Throughout that career, I 
served in rank from a patrol officer and retired as the captain. In those 29 and a half 
                                                 
7 New Oxford American Dictionary, s.v. “Emic,” Oxford University Press. 2015  
8 Kathryn Herr, and Gary L. Anderson, The Action Research Dissertation: A Guide for Students and 
Faculty (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, Inc., 2005), Kindle locations 598–600.  
9 Ibid., Kindle locations 606–609.  
8 
years, I served as a patrol officer, patrol sergeant, patrol lieutenant, and the patrol division 
commander. 
As a lieutenant, I supervised the Training and Accreditation section of the West 
Palm Beach Police Department. This unit dealt with compliance with certain policy 
mandates and insuring that the department personnel maintained state certification level, 
state recertification level, and career development. Additionally, the department was 
accredited based on the requirements of the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) organization. CALEA is an international credentialing 
organization that ensures that its member agencies meet numerous compliance measures 
as set forth by law enforcement’s major executive associations:  
• International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP); 
• National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE); 
• National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA); and  
• Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).10 
I also served 17 years as a member of the hostage negotiation team. I was the co-
chair for the Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets Committee for the South Florida 
Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) for the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (FDLE) region 7. During my tenure as a police officer, I was and still am 
certified as a trainer by the State of Florida and certified nationally to instruct in various 
levels of the Incident Command System (ICS). While with the city of West Palm Beach, I 
was also designated as the deputy emergency manager. Concerning the utilization of 
these experiences and the various interactions over 41 years, I refer to Herr and Anderson 
as they make point of to explain:   
Thus, local knowledge is most often shared, if at all, with only an 
immediate community of practitioners or community members. It is meant 
to address the immediate needs of people in specific settings, and it is this 
                                                 
10 Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, “The Commission,” 2010, 
http://www.calea.org/content/commission.  
9 
utility of knowledge generated by action research that represents one of its 
major strengths.11 
As stated in Stringer, “A common approach to action research envisages 
processes of inquiry based on a practitioner’s reflections on his or her professional 
practices.”12 Research for this thesis did not include interviews; however; class notes, 
conferences, and personal studies from over 41 years of public service forms, in part, the 
basis for this research. Kerr and Anderson point out, “Donald Schon’s (1983) book, ‘The 
Reflective Practitioner’ encouraged practitioners to begin to tap into their store of 
professional knowledge in order to make it explicit and share it with other 
practitioners.”13 
My personal experience within a military command and civilian law enforcement 
responses to critical incidents is chronicled to demonstrate, based on that experience and 
career education, that there is a better response model to active shooters that incorporates 
a joint team effort. The research method I chose for this paper is based on what is known 
as action research (AR) or participatory action research (PAR) as well as a number of 
other names, as noted by Kerr and Anderson:  
There are several terms in current use that describe research done either by 
or in collaboration with practitioners and/or community members. The 
most common ones are action research; participatory action research 
(PAR); practitioner research; action science; collaborative action research; 
cooperative inquiry; educative research; appreciative inquiry; 
emancipatory praxis; community-based participatory research; teacher 
research; participatory rural appraisal; feminist action research; feminist, 
antiracist participatory action research; and advocacy activist, or militant 
research.14 
The use of AR or PAR addresses a number of issues, one of which is the varied 
disciplines with which it can be used. As McIntyre writes in her book, Participatory 
Action Research:  
                                                 
11 Herr, and Anderson, The Action Research Dissertation, Kindle locations 203–205.  
12 Ernest T. Stringer, Action Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013), xv. 
13 Herr, and Anderson, The Action Research Dissertation, Kindle locations 424-425.  
14 Ibid., 153–155.  
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The originators of the principles, methodologies, epistemologies, and 
characterizations that inform PAR projects are worldwide and span many 
decades. In the late 1970s and 1980s, for example, Tandon (1981) and 
Kanhare (1980) initiated PAR projects in India that addressed adult 
education and women’s development, respectively. In Columbia, Fals-
Borda (1985, 1987) and his colleagues engaged in PAR projects aimed at 
increasing adult literacy. In neighboring Peru, de Wit and Gianotten 
(1980) participated in a training program for rural farmers. In Chile, Vio 
Grossi (1982) worked with local communities to address agrarian reform. 
Swantz (1982) and Mbilinyi (1982) engaged in PAR processes to improve 
education for peasant women and other residents of Tanzania. In that same 
country, Mduma (1982) participated in a PAR project with local 
Tanzanians to develop agricultural technology.15  
I synthesized my experience as well as existing and model policies to form a 
possible template for interoperability between law enforcement and fire/EMS. Within this 
portion of the analysis is the consideration of the legalities and liabilities to the various 
governmental entities that this new policy needs to address. In their book, Herr and 
Anderson describe the use of AR this way, “Unlike traditional dissertations that insist on 
a dispassionate, distanced attitude toward one’s research, action research is often chosen 
by (doctoral) students because they are passionate about their topic, their setting, and co-
participants.”16    
I looked at a compilation of open source historical data and case reports from past 
active shooter events (see Figure 2) to see the various responses from law enforcement 
and fire/EMS. 
                                                 
15 Alice McIntyre, Participatory Action Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2008), 
Kindle ed., Kindle locations 173–178.  
16 Ibid., Kindle locations 129–131.  
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These responses may begin to answer the questions as to what can and should be 
considered by responding units and by the command personnel while the operation is 
developing. One very important note concerning the review of historical incidents: I am 
very comfortable in stating that as calls for service develop, the dynamics involved 
change constantly, almost second to second. With that caveat, I can only comment on 
what is presented in open source references and not the minute-by-minute decisions made 
by the responders on a second-by-second basis. All responders made, at that time, the 
decisions and choices that they did based on the event and their training and experience at 
that time. I will endeavor to point out what we, the response community, know now and 
hopefully will not be taken to task for “Monday morning quarterbacking” of the actions 
taken at that time. It is not my intent to denigrate any of the responses but merely point 





























The thesis begins with the 1963 Texas tower shooting in Austin, Texas, and 
concludes with the Newtown, Connecticut, shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. 
The incidents that examined are: 
A. August 1, 1966, Austin, Texas (TX), University of Texas massacre  
B. July 18, 1984, San Ysidro, California (CA), McDonalds massacre  
C. January 8, 1986, Edmond, Oklahoma (OK), Edmond Post Office shooting 
D. October 16, 1991, Killeen, TX, Luby Restaurant massacre  
E. February 28, 1997, North Hollywood, CA, North Hollywood Bank 
shootout 
F. April 20, 1999, Littleton, Colorado (CO), Columbine High School 
shooting 
G. April 16, 2007, Blacksburg, Virginia (VA), Virginia Tech massacre  
H. February 14, 2008, DeKalb, Illinois (IL), Northern Illinois University 
massacre 
I. July 20, 2012, Aurora, CO, Aurora Movie Theater shooting 
J. December 14, 2012, Newtown, Connecticut (CT), Sandy Hook 
Elementary School massacre  
Each of the events selected have had an impact on civilian response procedures 
for future events. This thesis also includes a brief examination of the medical data from 
sources that detail information from the military and its progression in battlefield 
medicine, field triage, and treatment prior to evacuating the wounded to field hospitals. 
Based on historical studies by the U.S. military, I hypothesized that a faster response to 
an active shooter scene by EMS personnel while inside a protective cordon of police 
officers would permit a quicker and more capable first treatment response, thereby 
increasing the chances for a viable patient to reach a hospital emergency department. 
The final portion of this paper is an explanation of the initiation of a unified 
incident command system on scene to facilitate the cooperative actions of the responders 
while an on-going operation is taking place—one involving the active pursuit and 
elimination of the shooter(s) and the medical response and treatment of the injured. The 
results of the analysis demonstrate what has historically been right, what has gone wrong, 
and what has been missing. The final recommendation suggests how the various entities 
within a jurisdiction can join forces when responding to active shooter incidents 
13 
specifically. I hope these concepts can be utilized for other large incidents in a more 
comprehensive manner to facilitate a quicker interaction with the injured on scene and to 
establish a more cohesive incident command structure to address common problems and 
issues that may arise. 
  
14 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The issues of tactics and techniques for active shooter incidents are being brought 
to the forefront across the nation, and as a growing development at local, county, state, 
and federal training facilities. Some agencies have already adopted some model of 
response, including both law enforcement and medical personnel, and other agencies are 
examining the possibilities. Public safety training institutes are collaborating with 
educational facilities to provide this training, and private enterprise is preparing courses 
to address this need. It is proper to re-examine the historic incidents that have occurred in 
the country for not only the response procedures at the time but also what they inspired 
from other agencies. Any analysis of responses to treat casualties under fire must also 
incorporate the lessons learned from the military and its evolution of battlefield medicine 
and field treatment under fire. Figure 3 demonstrates the various sub parts of the thesis 
and the combining of the parts into the paper.  




A. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 
Texas State University in San Marcos is the headquarters of the Advanced Law 
Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT).17 ALERRT trains in two modules: 
level 1 is the basic LE response, and level 2 builds on level 1 with first aid training for 
buddy assistance and mass casualty care. Many national programs also offer the LE 
response portion by partnering with the Department of Homeland Security, such as 
Louisiana State University’s, National Center for Biomedical Research and Training 
(NCBRT).18 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also has information on its 
web page regarding online training and printed materials for active shooter 
preparedness. 19  At the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, based in Glynco, 
Georgia, there is a trainer program called Active Shooter Threat Instructor Training 
Program (ASTITP) 20  for law enforcement officers to become field trainers in their 
respective agencies and communities. Arlington County, Virginia has adopted a joint 
medical and law enforcement program that may well be the impetus of a national 
response plan known as the “ACFD Rescue Task Force.”21 
The trending issue of police response to active shooters has started a nationwide 
examination of the issue. Agencies from local, county, state, and federal are examining 
what methods can be utilized to provide faster treatment to the injured while locating the 
shooter(s). As noted above, there are a number of courses are offered.  
                                                 
17 ALERRT Center, Texas State University-San Marcos, “Home,” accessed June 14, 2013, 
http://alerrt.org/  
18 National Center for Biomedical Research and Training, “Law Enforcement Active Shooter 
Emergency Response (PER-275),” Louisiana State University, 2013, accessed June 14, 2013, 
http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/catalog/performance/laser.aspx.    
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter Preparedness,” last updated November 30, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness.  
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers,” accessed 
June 14, 2013, http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/enforcement-operations-division/active-shooter-
threat-instructor-training-program-astitp/.  
21 Arlington County Fire Department, Arlington County Fire Department Standard Operating 
Procedures: Rescue Task Force Response, SOP # F.28/Cat 1 (Arlington, VA: Arlington County Fire 
Department, 2013).  
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Additionally, the leading spokes organization for firefighters and emergency 
medical personnel, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), has released a 
position paper for what is identified as “Rescue Task Force Training.”22 Furthermore, the 
IAFF has also released a position paper titled Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Terrorist 
Events and note in it that responders “must find ways to marshal appropriate and effective 
responses to these events.”23 
Information written on the subject of response to active shooters has been from 
the police and EMS sides of the issue. For the police, an active shooter response is based 
on locating and eliminating the threat. For the EMS, the concern is access to the injured. 
Since the Columbine High School attack in Littleton, Colorado in 1999,24 there has been 
a change to the tactics and techniques that the police utilize for active shooter response as 
well as those used by the fire and emergency medical service units.  
To do proper justice to this subject of battlefield lifesaving during a police 
operation, multiple disciplines have been examined by both law enforcement and fire/
EMS, including not only the police tactical response but also the meshing of fire and 
EMS response, military lifesaving tactics. Hospital trauma considerations must also be 
examined as well as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident 
Command System (ICS). 
B. THE MILITARY MEDICAL FRAMEWORK 
No literature review that addresses the role of medical response and active shooter 
operations can be complete without the history and accomplishments of the military 
                                                 
22 International Association of Fire Fighters, IAFF Position Statement: Rescue Task Force Training, 
International Association of Fire Fighters, June 2013, http://www.iaff.org/Comm/PDFs/
IAFF_RTF_Training_Position_Statement.pdf.  
23 International Association of Fire Chiefs, IAFC Position: Active Shooter and Mass Casualty 
Terrorist Events, International Association of Fire Fighters, October 10, 2013, http://www.iafc.org/files/
1ASSOC/IAFCPosition_ActiveShooterEvents.pdf.  
24 Columbine Review Commission, The Report of Governor Bill Owens (Columbine, CO: Columbine 
Review Commission, 2001), https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-
%20Governor's%20Commission%20Report.pdf.  
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establishment from around the world. One of the sources that can be examined is the 
United States Army field manual (FM) 4–25.11, the first aid manual for the U.S. military. 
In another source, the author of an article entitled, “Eliminating Preventable 
Death on the Battlefield,” notes, “… historically, approximately 90% of combat-related 
deaths occur prior to a casualty reaching a medical treatment facility (MTF).”25 It is due 
to conflicts that civilian casualty care began to improve concerning trauma care. 
According to an article in Archives of Surgery, “Combat casualty care in World War II, 
the Korean War, and the Vietnam War resulted in incremental and significant 
improvement of civilian trauma care and systems.”26 
Mabry and De Lorenzo explain, “If a salvageable patient arrives alive at surgical 
care in the current conflict, the likelihood of survival is nearly 98 percent.” 27  A 
demonstration of the link to the cross-cultural move from the military side to the civilian 
side, “Army medics are now required to pass the civilian National Registry of Emergency 
Medical Technicians (EMT)-Basic examination, the entry-level civilian certification.”28 
It has been clearly demonstrated that the military medical community has increased the 
trauma treatment time over the past century:  
Rapid evacuation of the wounded began with basic aeromedical transport 
(without in-air medical care) in the Korean War and progressed to 
sophisticated multi-casualty helicopter transport with airborne treatment in 
Vietnam. The ‘average time from injury to definitive care decreased from 
12 to 18 hours in World War 11, to 2 to 4 hours in Korea, and to less than 
2 hours in Vietnam.29 
 
                                                 
25 Russ S. Kotwal et al., “Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield,” Archives of Surgery 146, 
no. 12 (2011): 1350–1358. 
26 Ibid., 1350.  
27 Robert L. Mabry, and Robert A. De Lorenzo, “Improving Role I Battlefield Casualty Care from 
Point of Injury to Surgery,” Army Medical Department Journal (MEDD Journal) (April–June 2011): 87–
91.  
28  Ibid., 91.  
29 Kenneth V. Iserson, and John C. Moskop, “Triage in Medicine, Part I: Concept, History, and 
Types,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 49, no. 3 (2007): 275–281.  
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On the subject of the Aurora, Colorado shooting, the Denver Post writes:   
Dr. Bruce Wapen, a board-certified emergency physician who works in a 
California hospital emergency department and occasionally serves as an 
expert witness, said minutes are critical for gunshot victims. ‘Minutes 
count,’ Wapen said. ‘With chest and great vessel injuries, and organ 
injuries, speed is very important.’30  
 
C. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
The response to active shooter incidents has gone through a period of evolution. 
From Charles Whitman in Texas to the most recent incident in Newtown, Connecticut, 
the police response has transitioned from attacking the shooter with whoever is available 
to hold and wait for the special weapons and tactical team (SWAT) to the most current 
response involving an ad hoc small unit or even single officer entry. 
Most literature concerning these tactics is discipline specific and ex post facto; it 
is non-peer reviewed journals directed to law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical 
services (EMS). The authors are experienced in their fields, but often times these pieces 
are opinion based on personal involvement, some brief study, or after-action report. What 
is of greatest value are the specific points that these collective minds produce from the 
incidents, lessons learned, and practice with specific tactics and modifications. The 
literature reveals that all responders must consider trauma care as well as the 
reconstruction of the crime.  
An issue that is becoming more prevalent is the nontraditional response of police 
officers is transporting the wounded upon arrival to the incident. In order to expedite the 
transport of the injured, in response to the 2012 Aurora massacre, Aurora police officer 
Justin Grizzle transported six people to the local emergency departments in four trips. 
According to an article in the Denver Post: 
By dawn, pools of blood gathered on his floorboards and seat cushions. 
There was blood on his car’s ceiling, on its dashboard, on its headrests. 
                                                 
30 Chuck Murphy, and Karen E. Crummy, “Some of the Most Injured in Aurora Massacre Waited for 
Help,” The Denver Post, July 25, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21149531/some-most-injured-
aurora-massacre-waited-help.  
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“There was so much blood,” Grizzle testified Monday, “I could hear it 
sloshing in the back of my car.”31 
Dr. Kevin Gerold, a physician at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and the 
Chair of the National Tactical Officers Association’s (NTOA) Tactical Emergency 
Medicine Services (TEMS) Section, states:  
patrol officers are now trained and equipped to intervene to end active 
killing, using tactics that were once reserved for special weapons and 
tactics (SWAT) teams. Where TEMS was conceived to support special 
operations teams, the time has come to provide patrol officers with basic 
TEMS training and equipment in order to potentially save the lives of 
victims, bystanders, police officers and suspects in the event they are 
wounded.32 
D. THE EMS RESPONSE 
For a response to an active shooter scenario, operations must incorporate the joint 
response for a mass casualty incident as well as a crime scene incident. All responders 
must consider trauma care and the reconstruction of the crime. As callous as it is, 
lawsuits will follow the incident in which all responders will play their parts once again. 
A document just released by the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) notes, 
“Local fire and police departments should establish standard operating procedures to deal 
with these unusual, highly volatile, and extraordinarily dangerous scenarios.” 33 
According to E. Reed Smith, and Blake Iselin:  
The current standard fire/EMS response to the active shooter is to stage in 
a secure location until police mitigate the threat and secure the area to 
create a scene safe for fire/EMS operations. However, there is a basic 
problem with this response: While waiting for a secure scene, those 
injured inside the building aren’t receiving care and are dying from their 
injuries.34 
                                                 
31 Ibid.  
32 Kevin Gerold, “TEMS Position Statement,” The Tactical Edge (Fall 2013): 86.   
33 International Association of Fire Fighters, IAFF Position Statement.  
34 E. Reed Smith, and Blake Iselin, “Toward the Sound of Shooting: Arlington County VA Rescue 
Task Force Represents a New Medical Response Model to Active Shooter Incidents, Journal of Emergency 




E. USING AN INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM  
Currently, when it comes to mixing and merging the various thought processes 
and job tasks for the initial first responders, there is a disconnect. The police have a 
specific job to accomplish— isolate and neutralize the attacker(s); EMS also has a 
specific job—the responsibility of treating the injured and wounded. There is a gap in the 
response training and planning across the country, the police are not being prepared for 
the medical necessities of the victims and the EMS personnel are not being prepared 
tactically to enter the scene and begin treating the victims. The exception to this rule is 
the tactical medic assigned to the SWAT teams who is present to attend to members of 
the SWAT team if they become disabled or wounded and not present to attend to injured 
civilians. Paul Atwater and others endeavor to close this gap from the firefighting side.35 
Theodore Moody, with a law enforcement background, examines the issue of the 
response action in his thesis. He remarks, “Filling the gap between NIMS/ICS and the 
law enforcement initial response in the age of the urban jihad.”36 In addition, Moody 
looks at the use of incident command to coordinate the responding agencies as well as 
communication capabilities. Additional resources remain discipline specific and do not 
look into the possibilities of advanced first aid training for law enforcement coupled with 
the tactical side of a joint emergency medical response for mass casualty active shooter 
incidents. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMATION 
The three primary disciplines, the military, law enforcement, and fire/EMS, all 
agree on the need for quick attention to the wounded. The military, as separate entity 
from the civilian first responders, has proven that immediate attention to combat wounds 
is imperative to presenting a viable patient to more advanced field medical facilities. 
                                                 
35 Paul A. Atwater, “Force Protection for Fire Fighters Warm Zone Operations at Paramilitary Style 
Active Shooter Incidents in a Multi-Hazard Environment as a Fire Service Core Competency” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=710217.  
36 Theodore Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial Response 
in the Age of the Urban Jihad” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
https://libsearch.nps.edu/vufind/Record/710235.  
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When a soldier receives first aid either self-applied, from a “battle buddy,” or from a 
trained medic, the chances of survival increase tremendously. The U.S. Army Rangers 
have proven the concept of field first aide with the information provided in studies of 
wounded Rangers as compared to other service members deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
A total of 419 battle injury casualties were incurred during 7 years of 
continuous combat in Iraq and 8.5 years in Afghanistan. Despite higher 
casualty severity indicated by return-to-duty rates, the regiment’s rates of 
10.7% killed in action and 1.7% who died of wounds were lower than the 
Department of Defense rates of 16.4% and 5.8%, respectively, for the 
larger U.S. military population (P=.04 and P=.02, respectively). Of 32 
fatalities incurred by the regiment, none died of wounds from infection, 
none were potentially survivable through additional prehospital medical 
intervention, and 1 was potentially survivable in the hospital setting. 
Substantial prehospital care was provided by nonmedical personnel.37 
Civilian responders have begun to slowly adopt the concept of field first aide 
using TEMS or a task force such as Arlington County, Virginia has initiated. At a 
minimum law enforcement has begun to reach out on two fronts. First, it now is 
beginning to equip officers with a field trauma first aid kit, permitting officers to make 
and carry their own, and teamed up with medical personnel to learn the basics of wound 
treatment, specifically ballistics wounds and hemorrhage control. On the other side of 
civilian responders, more is being done to train EMS and law enforcement to work 
together and to establish a frontline secured area for casualty collection and a quicker 
triage so that transportation can begin sooner. 
Where there seems to be a gap is in the cooperative training of the law 
enforcement and fire/EMS side. It seems a bit silly that both entities would arrive at an 
incident and not get together to work out a common operations plan to be more effective 
in doing their separate jobs in a more cohesive spirit of cooperation. However, training 
command teams and personnel to work together in tabletop exercises is one thing, but 
training the field operators is another thing altogether. Supervisors that have been through 
joint training are able to say “do it,” but the operators must also be trained to work 
                                                 
37 Kotwal et al., “Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield.”  
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together. This is as easy as pulling units out of service for an hour to meet and conduct 
overview training a few times a week or month. Having field personnel come together 
and explain what they bring to a common situation allows the other parties to see how 
and why they can work together in better harmony. Both law enforcement and fire 
personnel love their gadgets and can let each discipline train with each other’s equipment 
for familiarity. Then, a cohesive bond will begin to form. These responders know each 
other by site from the scenes they respond to; let them teach each other. 
Historically, once an active shooter event begins, the responders are minutes 
away. The arriving responders would encounter wounded traumatized victims. Police and 
fire/EMS protocols are changing from having to wait to enter the scene to having active 
entry teams that can enter much sooner. Getting first aid to the victims is a game changer 
as illustrated by the assassination attempt of Congresswomen Gabby Gifford. She was on 
an operating table within one hour and did not bleed out at the scene because of actions 
taken by the responders who were present. 
The literature is clear: 
• Fast medical intervention saves lives. 
• There is precedence for it and training is available. 
• There is a need for teamwork at these types of scenes.   
• It is dependent on the leaders to form these teams and insure that their 
combined mission of helping the public is realized.  
In the next chapter, we look at the tactics and techniques used by the responders, 
beginning with the military. As a matter of necessity, the military has continued to adopt 
battlefield treatment techniques to address the casualties of combat. Because of past 
events involving both law enforcement and civilian casualties due to violence, law 
enforcement has also begun to look at field treatments. The fire/EMS discipline also has 
adopted many of military techniques with regard to mass trauma incidents. With these 
premises in mind, the next chapter includes a look at the Incident Command System and 
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IV. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 
This chapter looks briefly at the disciplines that comprise the responder team. By 
utilizing the military as the foundation for active shooter response based on the potential 
need for medical assistance on the battlefield, we build on the law enforcement mission 
of neutralizing the aggressor(s), securing a “beach head” for follow-on forces of 
additional responding resources and assets as well as the immediate need for medical 
personnel to triage, treat, and transport the injured. This chapter shows that when the 
responders arrive on scene various tasking must be doled out to maintain control of the 
scene in a safe and orderly manner. Finally, the chapter concludes with the forming of a 
joint unified command under the ICS system. 
A. LESSONS FROM THE MILITARY 
In 1993, members of the U.S. military initiated an operation in Mogadishu, 
Somalia, intended to capture a number of commanders leading the insurgency in and 
around the city. The operation consisted of two phases. One was a ground movement of 
armored vehicles to the target location to assist in the securing it and to provide 
protection during the operation and after it as the units withdrew. The second phase was 
the helicopter insertion of troops onto the rooftop of the target location to capture the 
wanted leaders. As the mission started, one of the soldiers fast roping onto the roof of the 
building fell to the roof and was injured. As the mission continued, medical personnel 
attended to this injured soldier. The ground team now had the additional duty of treating 
and transporting this soldier, and three of the 12 vehicles were directed to do this. As the 
mission continued, a support helicopter was shot down, crashing into the city blocks 
away from the target location. Again, the commander decided to split his command and 
have a rescue team move, on foot, to the downed helicopter. The rescue team came under 
intense fire and was stalled on the ground due to injuries. Another rescue team in an 
armored vehicle was sent in to assist them and rescue the pilot. The total number of 
vehicles then rose to 25 and involved a few hundred ground troops.  
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In a review of the operation, a workshop held by military leaders later determined 
that with the amount of casualties in this mission, there was a greater need for medical 
assistance in addition to the medics assigned to the operation. The workshop committee 
determined, “If tactical medicine involves complex decisions about both tactics and 
medicine, then we must train the tactical decision-makers—the mission commanders—as 
well as combat medical personnel in this area.”38 Frank Butler explains in his paper for 
the Naval Medical Center San Diego (NMCSD), Tactical Medicine Training for SEAL 
Mission Commanders, “This engagement resulted in the most U.S. casualties in a single 
firefight since Vietnam (18 dead, 73 wounded). In addition, there was a delay of 15 hours 
before the first wounded were evacuated to a combat support hospital.”39  
The formal introduction of the tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) into the 
military began in 1997 with the Navy SEALS. This was followed a year later with its 
introduction to the Army Rangers. The Center for Army Lessons Learned describes:  
TCCC has three goals:  
• treat the casualty,  
• prevent additional casualties,  
• complete the mission.  
There are three stages of care with these goals: 
• Care under fire is the care rendered at the point of injury while both the 
medic and the casualty are under effective hostile fire. 
• Tactical field care is the care rendered by the medic once he and the 
casualty are no longer under effective hostile fire.  
• Tactical evacuation care is the care rendered once an aircraft, vehicle, or 
boat has picked up the casualty.40 
                                                 
38 Frank K. Butler, Jr., “Tactical Medicine Training for SEAL Mission Commanders,” Navy Medical 
Center San Diego, July 2000, http://www-nmcsd.med.navy.mil/support/trauma/specops/TACMED-
Butler.html.  
39 Ibid.    
40 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Tactical Combat Casualty Care Handbook (Ft Leavenworth, 
KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2010), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/
call_10-44.pdf.  
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TCCC also advocates the use of tourniquets on the battlefield and the use of 
hemostatic clotting agents in either a powder or a gauze form, as noted in the Butler and 
Blackbourne article. The authors explain:  
The studies of Kragh et.al. on tourniquet use in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
documented a remarkable incidence of lives saved with prehospital 
tourniquet use without causing preventable loss of limb from tourniquet 
ischemia. Studies of hemostatic agents used in combat have documented 
the efficacy of the previous agents HemCon and QuikClot. The newer 
hemostatic agent Combat Gauze has been shown in to be superior to 
HemCon and QuikClot in an animal model of lethal arterial bleeding; the 
initial report on battlefield use of Combat Gauze indicated good success in 
combat casualties.41 
The military has always been a test area for many of the practices and equipment that find 
their way into the civilian world. Battlefield medicine is certainly one of these, and its 
techniques are becoming more readily accepted in the civilian first responder 
communities.  
B. THE EMS RESPONSE  
Fire/EMS personnel responding to an active shooter incident have three choices: 
1) secure their gear and enter the scene as quickly as possible to get to the injured as soon 
as possible; 2) wait until the scene is declared safe/secure by law enforcement after the 
site has been thoroughly searched and begin rescue operations; or 3) enter the warm zone 
with a security detail after law enforcement has performed a quick security sweep. 
Choice 1 is extremely dangerous and goes against major safety protocols and policies for 
any agency. Choice 2 has historically been proven to be deadly for the waiting injured 
and emotionally traumatizing for the responders, witnesses, and family as well as being a 
tremendous liability for the jurisdiction. Choice 3 has started to become the best possible 
scenario for these types of incidents. 
                                                 
41 Frank K. Butler, Jr., and Lorne H. Blackbourne, “Battlefield Trauma Care Then and Now: A 
Decade of Tactical Combat Casualty Care,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery; vol. 73, no. 6 
(2012): Supplement 5, S395–S402.  
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As seen above, immediate medical treatment continues to save the lives of viable 
patients even while in a hostile area. It seems safe to point out that once a more prompt 
response is initiated, the morbidity and mortality rates would dramatically.  
Fire/EMS personnel constantly train and are drilled, even on calls, to perform a 
site assessment prior to entering any scene, and in many cases, they use the law 
enforcement on scene to perform this “blue canary” mission. This pause becomes the 
“warm” zone—that place between the cold and the hot zones. While traveling to the 
scene, they are being advised of the situation on scene and should understand the great 
possibility of arriving at a mass casualty scene and the necessary protocols to follow for 
cuts, lacerations, and penetrating wounds. 
C. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
The current law enforcement response to active shooters is aggressive and 
dynamic. Officers are taught when responding to an active shooter incident prepared to 
make entry, isolate, and neutralize the assailant as quickly as possible. The evolution for 
this strategy is demonstrated in the following reviews of historic cases as well as follow-
on chapters dealing specifically with the response aspects of such incidents. Responders 
have learned from the events of the past few years, and as a result, current training has 
begun to stress the need for law enforcement officers to decide to carry a weapon when 
off duty. If not needed on scene, then the officer will hopefully be a good witness; 
however, if needed, the officer is prepared to intervene to protect life.  
For many years, as part of their response to shooter events, officers were taught to 
establish a perimeter while the SWAT team was assembling and wait until SWAT arrived 
on scene to take over the incident response. This response plan has now changed to a 
more aggressive response with officers entering the scene and acting individually or in 
very small, ad hoc teams. What has also begun to change is the training that officers 
receive dealing with basic trauma care for persons or fellow officers shot by the assailant. 
The use of trauma dressings and tourniquets is becoming the norm for the basic line 
officer. This is based on a few hours of classroom training that stresses immediate care of 
hemorrhaging and maintenance of airways. In addition, officers are also being taught to 
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include an incident command protocol in their response, which is something that the fire 
responders have been doing for years.  
D. USING AN INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM  
The use of some form of coordination to respond to large incidents has been 
around for decades, and the use of a system for planned events or unexpected incidents 
has been field tested over that very long period. The use of an incident command system 
for the fire responders was developed in the 1970s for dealing with wild fires that 
encompassed hundreds and thousands of acres.  
In an excerpt from my 2009 thesis, here is a brief explanation of the NIMS and 
ICS:  
Based on the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, (HSPD-
5) 42  Management of Domestic Incidents, the secretary of homeland 
security (Tom Ridge at the time) was directed to formulate the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). The purpose of the NIMS, a 
flexible and standardized method, was designed as an all-hazards method 
of dealing with incidents on a national level.  
NIMS consists of six components: 
1. Command management utilizing the Incident Command 
System (ICS), a multiagency coordination approaches (MAC) and a public 
information system. 
2. A preparedness component involving planning, training, 
exercises, personal qualifications, equipment acquisition and certification 
process, mutual aid and publications management 
3. Resource management 
4. Command and information management to include incident 
management communications and information management 
5. Supporting technology 
6. On-going management and maintenance. 
The ICS component of the NIMS has been a tested and proven method of 
best practices involving incident management since its inception in the 
early 1970s for use in the wildfire communities in the west. In addition, 
                                                 
42 White House, Management of Domestic Incidents (HSPD-5) (Washington, DC: White House, 
2003), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html.  
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the ICS has been utilized for fires, rescues, hazardous materials (hazmat) 
incidents, as well as for biological and disease containment events. The 
main function of the system is its flexibility, use of compartmentalized 
“sections” for command and control, and performing specific “functions” 
to accomplish an overall mission. ICS has tremendous strength in its 
ability to expand and contract as needed, adding and deleting assets as 
necessary for an operation. ICS also incorporates the use of common 
terminology, accountability, and span of control, formal plans, and the use 
of “known” typed resources. Moreover, ICS is also able to operate in 
either a singular, unified, area command atmosphere, depending on the 
jurisdictions, agencies, and geographic area involved.43 
HSPD-5 directs the secretary of homeland security to develop the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), “prevent, protect against, respond to, recover 
from and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”44 
Utilizing the concept of “best practices,” the NIMS was created to address the “all-
hazards” concept of planning and responding. Based on the precepts of the NIMS, the 
National Response Plan (NRP) was created as the guideline for incidents occurring in the 
United States.”45  
The time for the planning of combined operations is prior to the event. Planning 
meetings or simple brain storming meetings can begin to generate the concepts that 
needed by both the law and medical sides. Heuer refers to as “cross-fertilization of 
ideas,” and he states that as a creative thinking strategy, “ideas should be combined with 
each other to form a more and even better idea.”46  
Clarity of information, intelligence, and performance lose a bit as responders 
enter an active incident. It is vitally important that their ability to perform is bolstered not 
                                                 
43 Martin T. Tierney, “Law Enforcement Planning and Response: A View toward Emergency 
Management through an Inverted Funnel” (master’s thesis, American Military University, 2009).  
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management Plan (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), i.  
45 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2004).  
46 Richard Heuer. Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 75–78.  
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only by the belief in their own capabilities but also in the knowledge that those working 
with them on the responder team are comfortable working with them.   
E. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I have endeavored to illuminate the components of an active 
shooter response utilizing the military as a platform for the law enforcement and fire/
EMS response. I concluded with what I believe is the paramount organizational setup to 
provide the 3Cs (command, control, communications) for all elements of the response 
utilizing a joint incident command model. The ICS model relies on its key ability to 
expand and contract as needed with an important caveat—that of not negating the 
command structure of the various disciplines that will be arriving and working on scene. 
The one true requirement for an effective ICS response is preplanning and practicing of 
the components to maintain the control of the incident together.  
In the next chapter, I examine the research design used to gather information from 
various jurisdictions, introduce the 10 historic cases, and also introduce myself to 
establish credentials for personal observations and comments made within this thesis. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter, we examine 10 historic active shooter incidents. I reviewed open 
source information and formal after action reports, when available, for these incidents for 
patterns of action or omissions of actions as can best be determined from the sources 
used. According to a study conducted by the New York City Police Department from 
2000 to 2012, there have been 324 attacks in our workplaces, schools, and public spaces 
by individuals who engage in what are known as “active shooter” events (see Table 1).47  
Before moving forward into the history of some of the attacks, it is important that 
certain information and statistics are brought to bear. Some of this information is new, or 
current, and in some instances, surprising and disturbing. At the October 2013 IACP 
conference, Special Agent James Yacone of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
noted the following statistics (see Figure 4) during his introductory remarks for the 
“Active Shooter 360” panel presentation. The presented information is from an academic 
study completed in 2012 regarding the last 35 events revealed.”48 
                                                 
47 New York City Police Department, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk 
Mitigation (New York: New York City Police Department, 2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter2012Edition.pdf.  
48 Personnel notes from the “Active Shooter 360” panel presentation, IACP Conference, Smart 
Policing, October 2013, Philadelphia, PA; Katherine W. Schweit, “Addressing the Problem of the Active 
Shooter,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (May 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/2013/May/active-shooter.  
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 2012 NYPD active shooter study Figure 4. 
• From 2000—2008 the U.S. averaged 5.2 incidents / yr 
• From 2009 to the present we averaged 15.75 active shooter 
incidents / yr 
• Victims have gone up nearly 150% 
• 74% attacker entered via main access point 
• 37% over in less than five minutes, remainders in less than 12 
minutes 
• 51% occurred in workplace 
Adapted from New York Police Department, Active Shooter Recommendations and 
Analysis for Risk Mitigation (New York: New York Police Department, 2012).  
The premier current study is one completed by the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD). This document, released right after the Newtown, CT shooting, 
speaks to only the 35 incidents from 2010 through Newtown incident, and a previous 
NYPD study looked at the 281 shootings from 1966 through 2010.49 What is important to 
note at this time in history is that between the two studies, “The NYPD’s analysis 
demonstrates that 98% of active shooter incidents in the active shooter data set were 
carried out by a single attacker. This finding is unchanged from the 2010 edition of this 
report.”50 This is critical in future concerns in light of the multi-assailant 2008 Mumbai, 
India attack, the January 2013 Amenas, Algeria, Tigantourine oil field attack, and the 
September 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya. It is very plausible, in fact 
probable, that multi-attacker incidents will strike this country in the future.   
The 2012 NYPD report provides information that demonstrates that these types of 
attacks are certainly not limited to schoolhouses and children. Table 1 appears in the 
NYPD report. 
                                                 
49 New York Police Department, Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation 
(1966–2010) (New York: New York City Police Department, 2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter.pdf.   
50 New York Police Department, Active Shooter Recommendations (2013), 5.  
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Table 1.   Active shooter locations 
Source: New York Police Department, Active Shooter, 8. 
Additional facts presented by the 2012 report concern the 192 incidents to which 
force was applied or the attacker committed suicide; the percentage for suicide is 48 
percent.51 The notion that upon arrival of law enforcement that the attacker will commit 
suicide seems contrary to this number. Fully half of the attackers were stopped by law 
enforcement or some other intervention (see Table 3). 
Table 2.   Active shooter resolution  
Resolution Number of Incidents Percentage 
   
Applied Force 99 43% 
No Applied Force 37 16% 
Suicide/Attempted Suicide 93 40% 
Attacker Fled 1 <1% 
Total 230 100% 
Source: New York Police Department, Active Shooter, 9.  
 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 3.  
 
Location Type Number of Incidents Percentage 
School 68 24% 
Office Building 31 11% 
Open Commercial 67 24% 
Factory/Warehouse 33 12% 
Other 80 29% 
Total 279* 100% 
* The 230 cases in the active shooter data set occurred at 279 locations because 
several attacks involved more than one location. The increase in incidents at 
“other” locations since the 2010 Edition is primarily due to the shootings in 
Wixom, Michigan, which occurred in at least 24 locations along a highway. 
NYPD 2012 report (table 1) 
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On August 27, 2013, the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) released a 
report entitled An Analysis of Active Shooter Events in the United States: March 2011–
March 2013. The report points out that in the 20 events included, “In nearly all cases 
(905), active shooter events take place in public locations (e.g., schools, malls, movie 
theaters)…in nearly 75% of the shootings…the assailant lived less than eight miles from 
their target.”52  
With regard to the shootings that have occurred across the nation, history shows 
us that an immense number of personnel and amount of resources can be used in the 
response to these events. Affected jurisdictions will initially have all on-duty personnel, 
fire, EMS, law enforcement either arriving at or moving toward the scene of the incident. 
Command personnel, city leaders, and other civilian assets and personnel will follow in 
short order. Depending on the jurisdiction, there will also be an influx of local, county, 
state, and federal resources. Additionally, according to Captain Joe Rios from Newtown, 
“within the first two weeks 65, different local agencies assisted with over 1,500 to 2,000 
officers.”53 This shows that the influx of people is not just at the initial scene. Of course, 
there will be other responders to include the media, non-government organizations (e.g., 
Red Cross, Salvation Army, or the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 
[VOAD]), self-volunteers, responding “professionals and experts,” do-gooders, plus the 
mail, gift packages of food, clothing, toys, and all the other items well-wishers send.  
As demonstrated by Sandy Hook, an incident can go from daily life to absolute 
chaos in a matter of a few seconds or minutes. It becomes a true “black swan” event—
very low on possibility, a high-risk scenario with tremendous consequences—or does it? 
The use of the term “black swan” describes an event that has three components, as 
defined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “I stop and summarize the triplet: rarity, extreme 
impact, and retrospective (although not prospective) predictability.” 54 Taleb uses the 
                                                 
52 New York State Intelligence Center, An Analysis of Active Shooter Events in the United States: 
March 2011–March 2013 (New York: New York State Intelligence Center, 2013), 3.  
53 Personal notes from IACP Conference.  
54 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable Fragility (New 
York: Random House, 2010), Kindle ed., Kindle locations 441–444.  
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term “outlier” to describe the first requirement—it is so far outside the scope of 
consideration that its occurrence is a rarity. The issue of public autogenic massacres is 
not new, not to the United States nor to the world; where this instance becomes a rarity is 
when it happens in one’s own town. If one were to graph a black swan event, it would 
have a very dramatic vertical rise at the left side of the chart indicating the beginning of 
the incident. The continuing incident would drop off gradually but continue out to the 
right for an extended distance. The spike on the chart, when a black swan incident occurs, 
exceeds all other incidents dramatically with a resulting “tail,” making it a “long tailed 
event” or one that matches Taleb’s second criteria (extreme).  
The task now becomes making sense out of the chaos that is occurring and is still 
occurring. One tool for consideration to address help with this is the “Cynefin 
framework,” created by Dave Snowden (see Figure 5). According to Snowden:  
The Cynefin (pronounced cun-ev-in) model focuses on the location of 
knowledge in an organization using cultural and sense making aspects of 
four different forms of community, both formal and informal. Three of 
these communities are a part of the day-to-day life of any large 
organization, the forth is domain of innovation and strategies for forcing 
innovation are discussed.55 
                                                 
55 David Snowden, Cynefin, A Sense of Time and Place: An Ecological Approach to Sense Making 
and Learning in Formal and Informal Communities (Surrey: University of Surrey, 2011), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.196.3058&rep=rep1&type=pdf, 1.  
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 Cynefin domains Figure 5. 
 
Source: Wikipedia, s.v., “Cynefin Framework,” accessed November 28, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynefin_Framework#/media/File:Cynefin_as_of_1
st_June_2014.png. 
Snowden quotes Sinclair and Nonaka and Konno, to explain:  
It describes that relationship: the place of your birth and of your 
upbringing, the environment in which you live and to which you are 
naturally acclimatized.” (Sinclair 1998). It differs from the Japanese 
concept of Ba, which is a “shared space for emerging relationships” 
(Nonaka & Konno 1998) in that it links a community into its shared 
history—or histories in a way that paradoxically both limits the perception 
of that community while enabling an instinctive and intuitive ability to 
adapt to conditions of profound uncertainty.56 
Thus, with that explanation, we can see that the incident becomes localized to us, 
to our community, to our singular and collective knowledge, cultures, plans, and training 
based on what we know of the community built as well as individual. It also entails what 
mechanisms we can bring to the table to address the particular pieces of which of the four 
                                                 
56 Nicholas Sinclair, in his preface to Kyffin Williams The Land & the Sea, quoted in Snowden, 
Cynefin.  
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domains we find ourselves in both individually and collectively. It is within these 
domains we must operate at that particular time. Snowden makes a clear distinction that 
the Cynefin diagram is a framework rather than one of categorization. He reasons: 
We make a strong distinction here between sense making frameworks and 
categorization frameworks. In a categorization framework, four quadrants 
are often presented in a two-by-two matrix (for examples, pick up any 
management textbook or analyst report). Typically, it is clear (though 
often unstated) that the most desirable situation is to be found in the upper 
right-hand quadrant, so the real value of such a framework is to figure out 
how to get to the upper right. In contrast, none of the domains we will 
describe here is more desirable than any other; there are no implied value 
axes. Instead, the framework is used primarily to consider the dynamics of 
situations, decisions, perspectives, conflicts, and changes in order to come 
to a consensus for decision making under uncertainty.57 
As can be seen in Figure 5, there are four visible “domains” to the framework, 
and the fifth is in the middle and represents disorder. It is from the center domain that 
decisions makers will lean toward their preferred domain for operating in if they are not 
sure which of the four are prevailing at the time. That choice by the leader becomes a 
place of self-interpretation of the decisions to be made. According to Kurtz and Snowden, 
“The stronger the importance of the issue, the more people seem to pull it towards the 
domain where they feel most empowered by their individual capabilities and 
perspectives.”58 
As a matter of reference, Table 3 shows the critical times for the incidents as 
determined from after action reports (AARs) or open source documents.  
 
                                                 
57 Cynthia F. Kurtz, and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a 
Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no 3 (2003): 468.  462–483.   
58 Ibid., 470.  
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Table 3.   Critical times 





 University of Texas 1148 1148/1153 ~1200 ~1318 1324 1212 (0:24) 
7/18/84 
Wed. San Ysidro, CA*
 McDonalds 1559 1604 1607 N//A 1716 ~1717 (1:18) 
1/8/86 
Wed. Edmond, OK*
 Edmond Post Office 0700 ~0700 0730 0830 0715 0730 (0:30) 
10/16/91 
Wed. Killeen, TX*





N. Hollywood Bank 




Tue. Littleton, CO Columbine High School 1119 1122 1124 1206 1208 ~1208 (0:49) 
2/4/98 
Thu. DeKalb, IL
 Northern Illinois Univ 1505 1506 1506 1507 1511 1617 (1:12) 
4/16/07 
Mon. Blacksburg, VA Virginia Tech Massacre 0940 0942 0945 0950 0951 0950 (0:10) 
07/20/12 
Fri. Aurora, CA Aurora Movie Theater 0038 0039 0040 N/A 0045 0049 (0:11) 
12/14/12 
Fri. Newtown, CT Sandy Hook Elem. School 0930 0936 0939 0944 0940 
10:001 (0:30) 
10:082 (0:38) 
*No after action report available, all information from public open sources.  
1 Police transport to EMS unit60  
2 EMS calls in first transport 
                                                 
60 “Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting—Newtown Police / Fire and CT State Police Radio Traffic,” YouTube video, posted December 14, 2012 by 
Radioman911TV, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ETkrxfYoQtc.  
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A. AUGUST 1, 1966, AUSTIN, TX, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS TOWER 
On the afternoon of August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman, a student at the University 
of Texas at Austin and a former United States Marine, rode the elevator to the top floor of 
the University Tower at the university. He then climbed the stairs to the twenty-eighth 
floor observation platform, 231 feet above the ground. While on the twenty-eighth floor, 
Whitman beat and eventually shot the receptionist for the observation deck. He 
encountered a couple coming down from the deck, exchanged pleasantries with them, and 
permitted them to leave. Next, Whitman encountered a family of six who were starting up 
the stairs toward him. Whitman fired his shotgun killing two and wounding two of the 
six. Dressed as a maintenance man, Whitman had used a hand truck to carry a footlocker 
with him that contained his supplies, among them food, water, rope, a transistor radio, 
and toilet paper as well as seven weapons with 700 rounds of ammunition. 
From his vantage point, using the weapons skills he acquired as a child growing 
up and honed by the Marine Corp, Whitman sighted in on basketball coach Billy 
Snowden. According to Lavergne, “But the distance was extraordinary. Of all the 
victims, Snowden was the farthest from the Tower—well beyond 500 yards.” 61 
Continuing his narrative, Lavergne also tells of another distant rifle shot by Whitman:  
He [Schmidt] stood up to say something like, “It’s okay, we’re out of 
range.” It was a fatal error. From over five hundred yards away, Whitman 
sent a round from the deck, over the entire length of the South Mall, over 
the Littlefield Fountain, over Neal Spelce’s mobile unit, over the hood of 
the Chevrolet, and into the abdomen of Roy Dell Schmidt.62 
At this point, approximately 20 minutes into the shooting, local law enforcement 
from Austin, Texas Department of Public Safety and the Secret Service detail for 
President Johnson were firing upon anything that moved on the tower. Lavergne 
                                                 
61 Gary M. Lavergne, A Sniper in the Tower: The Charles Whitman Murders (Denton, TX: University 
of North Texas Press), Kindle ed., Kindle location 3033.  
62 Ibid., Kindle locations 2952–2955.  
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observes, “It is not surprising, then, that Whitman did most of his killing and maiming 
during the first twenty minutes of the drama.”63  
As law enforcement responded, citizens of the community were fleeing, hiding, or 
converging on the scene. It becomes obvious, once again, that during any incident that 
the true “first responders” are in fact not law enforcement or fire/EMS but other civilians 
in the area of the incidents. Lavergne continues to narrate:  
Melvin Hees of Armored Motor Service was working in his office… Hees 
immediately located one of the (armored) cars and got it to the campus by 
12:35 PM, it was used to evacuate at least two victims, David Gunby and 
Adrian Littlefield; it probably saved their lives.64  
Lavergne continues, “the first of the victims to reach Austin’s largest medical care 
facility—Brackenridge Hospital. The time was 12:12 PM.” 65  Dr. Robert C. Stokes, 
working at the student health center, “received a call at 12:05 PM to go to the Tower… 
After Dr. Stokes treated them, an ambulance arrived to take the patients away….”66 Dr. 
Stokes would then move to two additional locations to treat the wounded once he 
coordinated with campus security. 
Whitman commanded the campus with both his vantage point and weapons skills 
from 11:48 AM until 1:24 PM. During that one hour and 36 minutes, he succeeded in 
killing 14 people and wounding an additional 32. Law enforcement were out gunned and 
eventually acquired rifles from a local sporting goods store to attempt to equalize their 
capabilities, a tactic that would repeat itself almost 30 years later in the North Hollywood 
shootout. Law enforcement also attempted to put a sniper in a small plane in an attempt 
to neutralize Whitman by air. This tactic failed to work as Whitman began shooting at the 
circling plane, but it did provide intelligence; his location on the tower and the fact that 
they were dealing with a single shooter. Shortly thereafter, armed with that information, 
law enforcement succeeded in entering the tower. According to Lavergne “For the first 
                                                 
63 Ibid., Kindle location 2923.   
64 Ibid., Kindle location 2960–2961, 2957–2958.  
65 Ibid., Kindle location 3103–3104.  
66 Ibid., Kindle location 3302–3304.  
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time in over ninety minutes Charles Whitman had company….”67 as officers entered the 
twenty-eighth floor glass enclosed observation deck and exited onto the walkway in two 
different directions. Officers Ramiro Martinez, armed with his pistol, and fellow officer 
Houston McCoy, armed with a shotgun, turned the corner of the tower to confront and 
killed Whitman. Lavergne summarizes:  
A total of thirty-three missiles were fired at Whitman by Ramiro and 
Houston. Ramiro fired six rounds from his revolver; Houston fired 
eighteen pellets in two shots. Ramiro (who had taken the shotgun from 
McCoy and charged a wounded Whitman) fired another nine pellets at 
very short range from one shotgun blast.68 
As this event captured the attention of America and specifically the police, a sea 
change occurred, the creation of a special trained force from within the police 
departments that were trained and outfitted specifically to deal with these types of 
situations, hence the birth of the special weapons and tactics teams, SWAT. There is 
some discussion as to where this started, some say the Los Angeles police department 
and others point out other agencies. The point is that American law enforcement began to 
train officers to respond to similar incidents with tactics and equipment. These tactics 
were learned from, among other places, the U.S. military and its then current role in 
South East Asia, Vietnam. 
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response  
• No command and control for the scene 
• No coordination capabilities among officers, fire/EMS, security, 
and federal officers 
• No communications capabilities among officers, fire/EMS, 
security, and federal officers 
• Civilian responders with firearms 
• Improper law enforcement weapons for a siege/barricaded gunmen 
• No tactics for a siege/barricaded gunmen 
                                                 
67 Ibid., Kindle location 3577.  
68 Ibid., Kindle locations 4761–4762.  
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• No “safe” method for extraction of the wounded from the field 
• No established triage area(s)  
2. Treatment and evacuation time  
• Those on scenes that were able to reach the injured and move them 
to safety or find them in a safe location began treatment. 
• Transport was ad hoc and done as needed 
 
B. JULY 18, 1984, SAN YSIDRO, CA, MCDONALD’S RESTAURANT 
On the afternoon of Wednesday, July 18, 1984, at 3:59 PM, James Huberty 
entered a McDonald’s restaurant in San Ysidro with an Uzi carbine, a Browning HP 
semi-automatic pistol, and a 12-gauge Winchester 1200 shotgun. He ordered everyone to 
“get down” and then began executing those in the restaurant. Starting at the serving line, 
he began firing, using the Uzi for most of the shots fired.  
Police units including four officers and a sergeant, were dispatched to the scene. 
The first officer, Miguel Rosario, arrived in the parking lot at 4:07 PM, and he 
encountered Huberty coming out a door. The officer was overwhelmed by the firepower 
and forced to seek cover as Huberty retreated back inside the McDonalds. Rosario was 
concerned that there was more than one shooter, and he requested SWAT and other units.  
When the incident was over, 77 minutes later, 40 people had been shot, and 21 of 
them were dead. Huberty succeeded in holding off the responding police, and it was not 
until he was killed by a police sniper could any medical treatment begin for those that 
injured. Huberty had also fired on a responding fire engine and struck a firefighter in the 
arm. One issue obfuscating law enforcement was the issue of the ability to see into the 
store. Dickinson describes, “Visibility into the building was severely hampered by a 
combination of sunlight, tinted windows and spider-webbed cracks from the previous 
gunshots.”69 
The local police and responders had not encountered a situation like this. Almost 
18 years had passed since the Texas tower shooting in Austin. “It was new then, as flying 
                                                 
69 Eric Dickinson, “Lessons by the Decade,” Law Officer, August 2013, 
http://lawofficermagazine.com/article/training/lessons-decades-0?page=2.  
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an airplane into the World Trade Center was new in 2001,” said Chuck Foster, the police 
sniper who ultimately ended the rampage. According to an article by Gresko, “All of the 
responders—the police officers, the firefighters, the paramedics—weren’t foreseeing the 
scope of this killing spree.”70 In his CNN article, Jim Kavanaugh quotes Captain Miguel 
Rosario, who was a patrolman at the time and the first responding officer:  
Police clearly needed more firepower and a new strategy, Rosario said. 
Captain Rosario continued, “The time had come where you had to have a 
full-time, committed and dedicated, highly trained, well-equipped team ... 
that were committed to shooting, being in shape and being able to respond 
rapidly anywhere in the city,” he said.71 
Kavanagh also explains, “The massacre also led to changes in police tactics, with 
officers reconsidering training practices that had them use force only as a last resort. New 
practices of providing mental health response teams evolved.”72 One additional result of 
this incident was the up arming of police across the country with more powerful weapons 
as well as special training for future situations of this kind. Table 4 shows the response 
time line for the incident. As a side note, this is the largest mass shooting in which the 
perpetrator did not commit suicide, up until police in the north Hollywood shootout killed 
Emil Decebal Mătăsăreanu; however, Mătăsăreanu’s partner Larry Eugene Phillips Jr did 
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Table 4.   Timeline of police response for the San Ysidro massacre73  
 
Adapted from: “San Ysidro Massacre: July 18, 1984,” San Diego Union Tribune, 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/san-ysidro-massacre/.  
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response  
• Improper weapons for a siege/barricaded gunmen 
• SWAT term relives on the perimeter, no entry made into an active 
shooter scene 
• No tactics for a siege/barricaded gunmen 
• No “safe” method for extraction of the wounded from the field 
• No “staging area” for support personnel (e.g., fire department, to 
wait outside the hot zone). 
• No scene perimeter to keep bystanders and press away from the 
active scene or the post scene.  
2. Treatment and evacuation time  
                                                 
73 “San Ysidro Massacre: July 18, 1984,” San Diego Union Tribune, accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/san-ysidro-massacre/.  
4:00 pm first calls to police communications.  
4:04 first police dispatch—4 officers and 1 sergeant 
4:07 Officer Mike Rosario is first on scene and engages the shooter, requests assistance 
4:08 paramedic units being their response, life flight alerted 
4:10 command post establish, SWAT callout made 
4:19 restaurant is surrounded by police 
4:35 first SWAT sniper team arrives 
4:45 all perimeter officers relieved by SWAT officers 
4:46 two witnesses escape and provide a better description of the shooter and advise  
that there are people shot inside 
5:02 second sniper team deploys 
5:04 sniper team asks if they have a green light to shoot to kill 
5:05 SWAT team commander enroute to the scene rescinds the green light order 
5:13 SWAT team commander arrives on scene gives the green light again 
5:17 SWAT sniper on post office roof fires one round killing the shooter. 
SWAT enters the building and are soon followed by medical personnel for triage,  
treatment and transport. 
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• No treatment and transport available until the scene was declared 
safe by law enforcement 
 
C. JANUARY 18, 1986, EDMOND, OK, EDMOND POST OFFICE 
At 7 AM on Wednesday, January 18, 1986, Patrick Henry Sherrill, a part-time 
postal employee, a former marine and Air National Guard handgun instructor, entered the 
Edmond, Oklahoma Post Office and began shooting his co-workers. This incident 
tragically became the impetuous for the phrase “going postal,” when used in an article for 
the now defunct St Petersburg Times on December 17, 1993. In the article, author Karl 
Vick speaks of a symposium held by the U.S. Post Office:  
The symposium was sponsored by the U.S. Postal Service, which has seen 
so many outbursts that in some circles excessive stress is known as “going 
postal.” Thirty-five people have been killed in 11 post office shootings 
since 1983. The USPS does not approve of the term “going postal” and 
has made attempts to stop people from using the saying. Some postal 
workers, however, feel it has earned its place appropriately.
74
 
In his article for the Enid News, Jeff Mullin refutes the “going postal” phrase:  
Subsequent research, however, has proven postal employees are no more 
likely to kill their fellow employees than workers in any other industry. 
Between 1992 and 1998, according to a Washington Post article, only 16 
of 6,719 homicides in the work place were committed by post office 
employees.75 
According to an article by Justus, “At the time there were seventy-three postal 
employees in the building.” 76  The rampage resulted in 14 killed and six wounded. 
Mullins, who also wrote an article on the incident, notes, “The whole incident took only 
15 minutes. In that time Sherrill fired some 50 rounds of ammunition.”77 Sherrill entered 
the facility with three weapons, and as he began shooting, he observed some of the postal 
workers run from a side exit. He chased them and shot them as they tried to flee. 
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Returning inside the facility he, “bolted several doors closed”78 and continued to shoot 
those in the complex. Two of the weapons he used for his rampage were taken from the 
National Guard armory.79 As Justus reports, “Most of the employees were out of the 
building in just over five minutes after the first shots were fired.”80 
Police arrived soon after the shooting began and for 45 minutes to contact 
Sherrill. An article by Canfield includes the following narrative:  
I stood on the front sidewalk with a few other employees and watched as 
two policemen ran toward the post office. One positioned himself near the 
front door. The other ran to the southeast corner of the building near the 
loading docks, then dodged to the front of my mail truck. He crouched 
down and peered out.81  
Blanco narrates the incident, explaining the perimeter that the police established 
as they waited for the SWAT team to arrive, “With weapons drawn, officers cautiously 
advanced toward the doors, mostly to assure the killer didn’t escape or to help victims 
who fled. The police would wait for the arrival of the SWAT team to invade the interior.” 
Blanco also explains, “A couple of minutes later, we saw [through the windows] a subject 
inside the post office walk up and bar the back doors, look out the windows for an 
instant, then disappear from view. The man was bald-headed and there was blood on his 
forehead.”82  
Sherrill could be seen from the outside through the windows. Blanco continues 
his narrative, “Approximately thirty seconds after he walked away [from view], at 
approximately 0715 to 0720, 1 heard the distinct sound of a muffled gunshot.”83 There 
were no more gunshots or sightings of the gunman. Eventually, the SWAT team went in 
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and found Sherrill dead. In his article, Canfield reports, “Macy said the police arrived at 
7:30 AM Lawmen began moving into the building at 8:30 AM, and heard one final 
gunshot on their way in.”84 Justus also reports, “Five members of the Edmond SWAT 
team entered the gallery at 8:35 AM …they also identified Pat Sherrill’s body at 8:40 
AM.”85 
The first person transported to the hospital was Bill Nimmo, who was taken by a 
civilian who had been stopped by other postal workers. Canfield quotes a police officer, 
“The first car I stopped was a white sedan with a women driver. I said ‘There has been a 
shooting and we have a carrier down. Can you take him to the hospital?’”86 Nimmo was 
placed in the backseat in the woman’s car and was then driven to the hospital, a distance 
of one mile, while being treated by other workers who were trying to stop the bleeding. 
Justus notes, “By 7:30 AM the three wounded men were on their way to Mercy 
Hospital.” He explains:  
In a very short time, an AmCare ambulance drove up on the sidewalk 
between the injured and the building. The emergency personnel worked 
swiftly to control the bleeding before they placed the three men in the 
ambulance and headed for Mercy Hospital Trauma Center.  
Once again, the actual first responders had initiated the life saving measures for 
some of their co-workers, as Justus notes, “The doctors at Mercy Hospital said Judy, like 
Gene Bray, would not have lived another twenty minutes if they had not been treated.”87  
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response  
• First responding officers, per protocol, establish a perimeter on the 
building, make no entry into an active shooter scene 
• Employees were able to provide information/intelligence 
immediately to police 
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• SWAT team arrives and per protocol attempts contact inside the 
building 
• SWAT team makes no entry into an active shooter scene 
• No “safe” method for extraction of the wounded from the field 
• No “staging area” for support personnel (e.g., fire department, 
which had to wait outside the hot zone). 
2. Treatment and evacuation time  
• Co-workers and bystanders, the “first responders,” initiated 
treatment and evacuation of the wounded that fled the building. 
 
D. OCTOBER 16, 1991, KILLEEN TX, LUBY RESTAURANT 
During lunch hour on October 16, 1991 at the Luby’s restaurant, George Hennard 
crashed through a window with his pickup truck. Upon exiting his truck, Hennard used 
two pistols, a Glock 17, and a Ruger P89 to shoot customers. According to an article by 
Hayes, “Vernon Schrader, a vice president for Luby’s Cafeterias Inc., said no employees 
were wounded or killed.” 88 Between 12:39 and 12:51 PM, Hennard shot 50 people, 
killing 23, and 10 of those with a single shot to the head. During the course of the 
shooting Hennard could be heard saying, “…was it all worth it?”89 “This is what Bell 
County did to me;” and “All women of Killeen and Belton are vipers.”90 Hennard would 
pass over men to shoot women. 
There was an almost immediate response from the police. According to the article 
by Hayes:  
Five state law-enforcement officials were leading a class for local police 
officers in a hotel near the restaurant, said Michael Cox, a spokesman for 
the Texas Department of Public Safety. Only a bank separated the 
buildings, and the officers ran to the restaurant as soon as they heard the 
shots, he said.91  
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An article in The Press-Courier narrates:  
Three Killeen officers and one Texas Department of Public Safety trooper 
entered the restaurant about 12:44 PM and started shooting at Hennard. 
Police also released tapes of radio transmissions that indicate the gunfight 
lasted about seven minutes. Police have said before that Hennard did not 
kill anyone after the gunfight began.92  
Hennard was actively stalking and shooting victims prior to the police arrival for 
five minutes. Two officers, Kenneth Olsen and Alex Morris, reported that they had fired 
35 rounds, which contributed to the “…170 pieces of ballistic evidence…including shell 
casings, bullet fragments and the weapons.” 93 The report in The Press-Courier also 
indicates that Hennard hid in the bathroom and killed himself after being wounded twice 
by police. The call for medical assistance came immediately after the shooting stopped. 
The Press-Courier quotes, “We need Medevac…ambulance to the front…all the extra 
help we can get…need as many paramedics as we can muster.”94  
One impact of this incident was that  
in 1995 Texas passed a “shall-issue” gun law, which requires that all 
qualifying applicants be issued a concealed handgun license (the state’s 
required permit to carry concealed weapons), removing the personal 
discretion of the issuing authority to deny such licenses.
95
  
Suzanna Gratia Hupp, whose parents were killed in the shooting, initiated the campaign 
for the law.96 Mrs. Hupp ran for the Texas House of Representatives because of the 
shooting and served five terms from 1997 to 2007. 
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
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1. Analysis of response  
• Officers respond to the sound of gunfire and enter immediately 
engaging and wounding the shooter and ending the assault. 
• Immediate aid is requested by officers on scene. 
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• Aid begins immediately, fire/EMS had staged during the attack.  
E. FEBRUARY 28, 1997, LOS ANGELES, CA, N. HOLLYWOOD 
SHOOTOUT 
On Friday, February 28, 1997, Larry Eugene Phillips Jr and Emil Decebal 
Mătăsăreanu entered the North Hollywood branch of the Bank of America. Between 9:17 
AM and 10:01 AM (for 44 minutes), the two bank robbers entered the bank, secured 
employees and customers inside the vault, and exited the bank, beginning what was the 
largest police shootout in modern history. When the shooting finished, the casualty count 
for police and civilians was 17 injured, including 11 police officers, but none killed. 
Police killed Emil Decebal Mătăsăreanu and, according to the Los Angeles Times:   
Larry Eugene Phillips Jr., shot himself in the head, but it could not be 
determined whether that bullet killed him or whether another potentially 
fatal shot fired by police about the same time caused his death, according 
to the autopsy reports released Thursday.
97
 
Phillips and Mătăsăreanu had five rifles and over 3,000 rounds of ammunition in 
box and drum magazines as well as a pistol. Each was wearing body armor. In a piece for 
the Daily News, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Assistant Chief Michel Moore 
said, “We had trained for terrorists as part of the Olympics, but this was beyond what 
anyone thought would ever happen.”98 
Of the rounds fired, the robbers fired approximately 1,100 rounds, many of them 
armor piercing. The police also fire rounds. As described in an article for the Whittier 
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Daily News, “More than 300 sworn personnel returned fire with 750 rounds….”99 Seeing 
the amount of firepower against them, police, who carried 9mm Berettas with 15-round 
magazines, saw a need for great firepower than their duty weapons saw a need for  a 
change in tactics. As CNN reported, “...the mismatch prompted Lt. Nicholas Zingo to 
send officers out for more firepower. The nearby gun shop, B&B Sales, provided two 
AR-15s, the civilian version of the Army’s M-16 assault rifle, a shotgun, and rifles with 
telescopic sights.”100 This same tactic was used in 1966 at the Texas Tower shooting 
where rifles were provided to some of the officers from a sporting goods store.  
One of the injured officers, Martin Whitfield, reflected back, “I know a lot of the 
training I went through, my military background helped me stay cool headed but when it 
came down to it, the last thing I did was open my mouth and pray.” 101  Whitfield 
sustained multiple wounds. “Whitfield was shot four times: in the left arm, left buttock, 
right thigh and under his right arm,” according to a LA Times story published six months 
after the shooting.102 
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response 
• Command and control was initially established via radio, as the 
incident grew control was limited and eventually nonexistent. 
Training and experience then took over. 
• Communications became overwhelmed.  
• No time to evacuate citizens or establish a large enough 
containment perimeter to keep civilians from driving through the 
final scene as it unfolded. 
• Responding officer’s weapons were inadequate for the distance 
and body armor of the two subjects. 
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• This event led to greater firepower for the police with the purchase 
of M-16s. 
 
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• First aid began in the field by responding officers and civilians for 
the injured. Some evacuations were possible. 
 
F. APRIL 20, 1999, LITTLETON, CO, COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL 
On the morning of Tuesday, April 20, 1999 at 11:19 AM, Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold, both students at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, began their 
assault on the high school. For the next 16 minutes, until 11:35 AM, they walked from 
the outside of the school into the library, killing 10 people in the library, wounding 12, 
and leaving 34 unharmed. The final casualty count in those 16 minutes was 13 dead and 
12 wounded. At 12:08 PM, the two committed suicide, a fact that was not discovered for 
three additional hours.  
To begin the assault, the two placed a firebomb in a field about three miles south 
of the school, which was set to explode at 11:14 AM. The purpose of this device was to 
divert firefighters and police away from the school. The two students then drove their 
cars to the school parking lot. The proceeded to the cafeteria and carried in and placed a 
bomb made of two 20-pound propane tanks set to explode at 11:17 AM. The pair then 
returned to the parking lot, according to their plan, to await the explosion. Once the 
explosion went off, they begin to shoot the fleeing students as they ran from the building. 
According to an article by Mell and Sztainkrycer, “At one point, law enforcement 
personnel believed as many as eight perpetrators had seized control of the school in an 
organized attack.”103  
Columbine High School Resource Officer, Neil Gardner, a Jefferson County 
Sheriff’s deputy, was assigned fulltime to the school. Gardner was sitting in the parking 
lot having lunch when the pair began shooting other students outside the building. Two 
students were killed immediately. Deputy Gardner was called to the south side of the 
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school for what was initially reported as a girl hit by a car. He proceeded to the south lot 
with lights and siren where he came under fire from Harris. Harris and Gardner 
exchanged gunfire over a distance of 60 feet, Harris with his rifle and Deputy Gardner 
with his service pistol, and neither struck his target. Harris then fled into the school. Five 
minutes had passed since the first shootings and two minutes since the radio call to 
Gardner. As Harris fled into the school, Deputy Gardner called for assistance to the south 
lot on his police radio. Two deputies responded to the call via the west side of the campus 
and initiated a rescue of students that were wounded and outside the school building. At 
the same time, Harris and Deputy Gardner became involved in a second gunfight; 
however, this time Deputy Paul Smoker also returned fire toward Harris, who then fled 
back into the building.  
According to the governor’s commission report, “…six officers from the 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office had arrived on scene within minutes after the attack 
had begun.”104 The commission also points out that three of the officers had observed 
and exchanged gunfire with at least one of the shooters. The report also notes, “As it is 
deemed unsafe for paramedics to enter, SWAT members are to extract patients out to 
R13.”105 
Teacher Dave Sanders was struck with a shotgun blast and was moved into a 
classroom. Students and another teacher made a sign for the window, “1 bleeding to 
death”106 in order to alert responders of the situation. Students administered first aid to 
Sanders to no avail; he was the only teacher killed. 
Referring to the Columbine Commission Report and extrapolating from that 
document the following timeline notes some of the events to demonstrate the time delays 
involved in the response. Shortly after 2:30 PM, injured student Patrick Ireland crawled 
to the library windows and climbed out the window where he was caught by SWAT 
members. There had been explosions in the building as officers arrived on scene and 
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authorities relayed fleeing students’ information of the suspects having pipe bombs. A 
little after 1 PM SWAT teams entered the school.  “Student Lisa Kreutz was wounded 
while in the library, she was finally evacuated at 3:22 PM, along with Ms. Patti Nielson, 
Brian Anderson, and the three library staff who had hidden in the break room. At 4:30 
PM, the school was declared safe, however; at 5:30 PM additional officers were called in, 
as more explosives were found in the parking lot and on the roof. By 6:15 PM, officials 
had found a bomb in Klebold’s car in the parking lot.”107 
Although prevented from entering the building, the fire department succeeded in 
evacuating the injured from the scene and turned them over to the large number of private 
ambulances that had also responded. In this manner, they were successful in triaging 
wounded on scene, evacuating them, and returning to continue the triage as more 
wounded were found. According to Mell and Sztajnkrycer, “From an EMS operational 
standpoint, this was more of a multi-victim scenario than a true mass casualty scenario 
(generally defined as when the number and needs of the victims overwhelm available 
EMS resources).”108 
According to the Columbine Commission Report “…within a short time there 
were more than 1,000 officers and emergency medical personnel on the scene.”109 This 
became an issue as entry was made into the building. As explained in the Columbine 
Commission Report, “Many members of the teams were from police agencies outside 
Littleton and Jefferson County. Hence, their knowledge about the building’s interior was 
limited to hasty sketches drawn for them by local officers.”110 Because of the explosions 
inside the building from the improvised explosives, the school’s fire alarm and sprinkler 
systems were both activated. The commission’s report notes, “…indeed, the alarms were 
not turned off until some six hours later.”111 
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Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response 
• There was no immediate entry despite officers having exchanged 
gunfire with at least one shooter and multiple victims down outside 
the building as well as shots being heard inside the building. 
• Entry would be delayed with the number of shooters in the 
building as well as their whereabouts unknown. 
• No command and control for the agencies and over 1,000 
personnel that arrived on scene. 
• No staging areas established.  
• No communications capabilities across the multiple response units.  
• Three command posts established to coordinate the response.112 
• Self dispatching, self deployment of LE agencies.   
• Delay in entry leading to the death or prolonged lack of treatment 
for the injured.  
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• Treatment and evacuation began for those that were self-
evacuated, assisted or outside the school building. 
• Hasty evacuations of the wounded by medics to private 
ambulances aided in treatment.  
• Extensive time delay permitting EMS into the school per EMS and 
police policy based on the scene not being declared safe while the 
search for additional shooters took place as well as the improvised 
explosives located and used in the building. 
• None of the injured who were alive when they reached the hospital 
died. 
 
G. APRIL 16, 2007, BLACKSBURG VA, VA TECH 
On April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho, a student at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, 
Virginia, succeeded in killing 32 students and professors. Of the 32, two were killed 
earlier in that morning in one of the dormitories. The remaining 30 were killed in Norris 
Hall in about nine minutes (9:42–9:51 AM) by Cho, who used a Glock 19 9mm pistol 
and a Walther P22 .22 pistol. In the end, Cho committed suicide in one of the classrooms. 
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Cho entered Norris Hall and proceed to chain the three doors closed, leaving a 
note on one of them that any attempt to open the doors would result in a bomb 
detonation. According to a report by the Virginia Tech Review Panel, “Cho begins 
shooting in room 206 in Norris Hall, where a graduate engineering class in Advanced 
Hydrology is underway. Cho kills Professor G. V. Loganathan and other students in the 
class, killing 9 and wounding 3 of the 13 students.”113 Cho then went to  
room 204, Professor Liviu Librescu, an Israeli Holocaust survivor, 
forcibly prevented Cho from entering the room. Librescu was able to hold 
the door closed until most of his students escaped through the windows, 
but he died after being shot multiple times through the door. One student 
in his classroom was killed. Students of Liviu Librescu, 76, an engineering 
science and mathematics lecturer in at Virginia Tech for 20 years, sent 
emails to his wife, Marlena, telling of how he blocked the gunman’s way 
and saved their lives, said the son, Joe. ‘My father blocked the doorway 
with his body and asked the students to flee,’ Joe Librescu said from his 
home outside of Tel Aviv. ‘Students started opening windows and 
jumping out.’114 
From there, Cho moved classroom 211 in Norris Hall where students had blocked 
the door, slowing Cho down. Upon forcing the door, Cho killed the professor and a 
student at the door then continued to kill 11 students and shot six others, who survived. 
Cho returned to room 207 where he wounded two additional students as they blocked the 
door. Cho then moved to room 206 where he killed two more students, including one 
who lay across another student shielding and saving the student underneath. The door of 
room 205 was barricaded; Cho could not force the door and fired into the door but did not 
hit anyone. A professor on the third floor secured students in his office then went 
downstairs to investigate; Cho shot and killed him, but none of his student’s sustained 
injuries.  
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In the end, 10–12 minutes after it began, Cho returned to room 211, placed the 
Glock 19 to his right temple and pulled the trigger ending the rampage. According to the 
report to the governor, “Cho’s shooting spree in Norris Hall lasted about 11 minutes. He 
fired 174 rounds, killed 30 people in Norris Hall plus himself, and wounded 17.”115 
According to an article by Horowitz, “All of the victims had been shot at least three times 
each; of the 30 killed, 28 were shot in the head.”116  
Virginia Tech police arrived within three minutes of the 9-1-1 call. The quick 
response was due to a training event being held for the SWAT team. The chained doors 
allowed them no access until they managed to shoot the lock on the door to the 
maintenance door. Two police response teams, consisting of officers from multiple 
agencies, entered the building. One team consisted of five officers and the second of 
seven officers. The seven-officer team located the five-officer team on the second floor 
and proceeded to the third floor to continue searching and to prevent crossfire threats. 
The five-officer team located Cho in room 211. Additionally, they then began the task of 
rescuing the victims. The after action report indicates that the police officers were used to 
assist in some first aid. It reads, “Since the scene was not yet secured at this point to 
allow other EMS providers to enter, the tactical medics quickly instructed some police 
officers how to use the (Asherman Chest) seal.”117 Also according to the Virginia Tech 
Review Panel, “The police carried several victims who were still alive to the lawn outside 
the building, where they were turned over to a police driven SUV that took the first 
victims to emergency medical treatment.”118 
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response 
• PD made a quick arrival due to investigation of earlier shooting by 
Cho in the dormitory; tactical teams were on campus as a result. 
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• Entry was made as quickly as possible. Officers tried three 
entrances that were locked and had no breeching equipment but did 
attempt to shoot the locks and chains. 
• PD officers establish critical security points inside the building at 
stairwells in the event this was a multiple shooter incident. 
• The exterior containment perimeter was established as the entry 
teams were inside sweeping the building. 
• No PD or Joint ICS was established due to the rapid evolution and 
ending of the incident. ICS was used in the post investigation. 
• Virginia Tech Rescue overheard the shooting call and immediately 
began establishing a Command Post at their building. Units were 
staged until the all clear was given by PD.  
• Within 10 minutes of the incident emergency notification alerts 
went out campus wide.  
• “It also appears that there was inadequate communication between 
the police who were clearing the building and those outside 
guarding the exits.”119Officers should have escorted the civilians 
from the building. 
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• Rescue evacuations began as soon as possible by the entry teams 
using security and carry teams. 
• The initial triage was done by two SWAT medics.  
• Injured were transported away from the scene to waiting medics 
for triage and transportation.  
• At 10:09 AM the police gave the all clear and EMS personnel 
entered the building.  
• By 10:51 AM all patients were transported from the shooting 
scene. 
 
H. FEBRUARY 14, 2008, DEKALB, IL, N. ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
On Thursday, February 14, 2008, at approximately 3:05 PM CST, Steven 
Kazmierczak entered Cole Hall (Auditorium 101). At that time, there were approximately 
120 students in the hall. From the point where he entered, Kazmierczak walked directly 
onto the auditorium stage at the front of the classroom. From there, using a shotgun and a 
                                                 
119 Ibid., 97.  
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Glock 9 mm pistol, he fired into the gathered students. When he was done, he had fired 
six shotgun rounds, and 48 pistol rounds. At 3:11 PM, Kazmierczak fired one final time, 
killing himself. According to a report on the incident, “It is estimated that from the time 
Kazmierczak started shooting until the time he was reported ‘down’ and the auditorium 
declared safe was approximately six (6) to six and one-half (6 ½) minutes.”120 In those 
brief moments, he had killed five and injured another 17 with gunfire.  
It took university law enforcement personnel less than 30 seconds to arrive at the 
scene once the call was broadcast. At 3:06:07 PM, Northern Illinois University 
Department of Public Safety (NIUDPS) officers were alerted that there was “a 911 call at 
Cole Hall saying there has been a shooting. . . .” At approximately 3:06:33 PM, three 
NIUDPS officers had responded and reported, “Northern 30, we are in the area.”121 In 
less than five minutes, the senior officer advised dispatch over the radio that the incident 
was over. At 3:11:42 PM (five minutes after the first 911 call), Ellington reported to the 
dispatcher, “Shooter’s down. Shotguns secure. We need an ambulance and the coroner at 
Cole Hall.” The fire report, indicates, “The Fire Chief arrived at 3:08 PM … The dispatch 
personnel, doing their support job advised at 3:08:22 PM, Unit 39, 10–4; 47 …we have 
an ambulance en route.”122 
Law enforcement officers began their job of securing the crime scene, locating 
injured and witnesses as fire/EMS arrived and began administering to the injured. Police 
Chief Donald Grady took control of the scene and directed officers to begin attending to 
the victims. Of note in the response by police officers is the fact that all members of the 
responding university officers “were cross trained as Emergency Medical Technicians 
(EMTs) and assisted in the treatment of the wounded as part of their response on entry 
teams.”123 Chief Grady also had the officers use the Holmes Student Center, for student 
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121 Ibid., 3.  
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interviews. Per the department plan, staging of arriving regional assistance was done in 
the parking lots near the Field House. At 3:21 PM, officers declared the scene safe, which 
permitted responding units from other jurisdictions, including police and fire, to proceed 
to the scene and to areas were the wounded were gathered. Per the governor’s report 
regarding incident, “The first victim was transported at 3:26 PM for the short trip to the 
hospital.”124 
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response 
• Operations established immediately in a pre-planned staging area.  
• PD and FD had separate staging areas pre-planned.  
• The shooter committed suicide prior to the police arriving.  
• PD looked for additional shooters while clearing the scene for 
EMS to enter.   
• PD initiated medical triage, all were trained EMTs.  
• A three layer perimeter was established.  
• ICS was established with PD as command until confirmation of a 
sole shooter then command switched to FD.  
• ICS command communications was done face to face.  
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• Preplanning had established staging areas.  
• PD were EMT trained and began the triage while still searching for 
additional shooters.  
• FD as well as PD responded to various ad hoc casualty collection 
points on campus.  
• Patient information was sent to command who then released units 
from the staging area.  
• The first transport was done 11 minutes (3:26 PM) after FD was 
allowed into the scene; the last patient (18) was transported at 4:54 
PM.  
 
                                                 
124 Northern Illinois University, Report of the February 14, 2008.   
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I. JULY 20, 2012, AURORA, CO, CENTURY 16 MOVIE THEATER  
On Saturday, July 20, 2012, between 12:38 AM and 12:45 AM (seven minutes), 
James Eagan Holmes was in theater 8 of the Century 16 Movie Complex in Aurora, CO. 
Holmes exited then re-entered the theater via a back exit door. Holmes discharged smoke 
grenades and began to shoot the patrons in the theater. In seven minutes, Holmes killed 
12 and injured 70 (58 from gunfire, four from tear gas, and eight from fleeing accidents). 
Holmes was taken into custody at the rear of the complex as he was standing at his car. 
Holmes had purchased a ticket for the movie, and during the movie, he exited the rear 
exit door and proceeded to his parked car at the rear of the theater. According to Black:  
Back at his vehicle, he donned an assault vest, riot helmet, gas mask, black 
clothing similar to that of a SWAT officer and grabbed a Smith and 
Wesson M&P AR-15, two Glock .40 caliber pistols (G22 and G23), a 
Remington 870 Express Tactical 12-gauge shotgun and tear gas 
canisters.125  
Holmes had also set up an elaborate series of booby traps with hand grenades and 
gasoline in his apartment with the intent of killing anyone who attempted to enter. After 
capture, Holmes alerted police of the trap, permitting the apartment to be safely cleared 
of explosives. 
The first 9-1-1 call came in at 12:39 AM. A report by TriData Division on the 
incident notes, “The Public Safety Communications Department handled 6,000 calls 
instead of the 1,500 on a typical day…”126 Within 90 seconds they were on scene. At 
about 12:45 AM, police apprehended Holmes in the rear of the theater at his car, and 
Holmes offered no resistance.  
With Holmes in custody, Aurora Police Department (PD) still believed that there 
might be additional shooters in the complex. It was announced that the scene was not 
                                                 
125 Bryan Black, “Deconstructing the Aurora Colorado Shooting and What We as Responsible 
Citizens Could Have Done to Help,” Imminent Threat Solutions, July 23, 2012, http://www.itstactical.com/
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safe, which stopped the fire department and EMS from closing on the scene more 
quickly. According to a report by Tri-Data:  
While Aurora police charged into a multiplex theater within three minutes 
of the first report of a shooting there, more than 20 additional minutes 
passed before medical personnel arrived at the epicenter, a period when at 
least one victim was still alive but in desperate need of medical attention, 
dispatch tapes from that night show.
127
  
One other major issue that surfaced almost immediately for the responders was 
the fact that the incident parking lot for the complex had limited access and egress points. 
According to Aurora Fire Captain Al Robnett, “They were unable to immediately get 
closer to the theater because the lot was packed with cars from patrons and police.”128 
The rear door of the theater became an access point to begin moving the wounded 
from the theater. According to John Ingold, a reporter for The Denver Post,  
Sergeant Stephen Redfern, one of the first police on the scene, decided not 
to wait for ambulances and sent victims to area hospitals in squad cars. His 
(Redfern’s) requests for ambulances to the back of the theater were not 
immediately met… “after what seemed liked awhile, they were not getting 
through, So I decided we should start transporting victims in police 
cars.”129  
Numerous lives were save as well as getting seriously injured victims the help 
they needed more quickly based on Redfern’s decision. In his Denver Post article, Ingold 
states, “Of the 60 victims transported to hospitals after the shootings—many of them in 
the back of police cars—all but two were saved. One officer, Justin Grizzle made four 
trips between the theater and hospitals.” 130  As reported in the LA Times, “Grizzle 
eventually drove half a dozen victims to the hospital in a vehicle so inundated with blood 
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Denver Post, October 15, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24316871/aurora-police-
sergeant-describes-life-saving-theater-shooting.  
130 Ibid.,  
65 
he said he could hear it slosh as he rounded corners.” 131 A report by the Tri-Data 
Corporation remarks, “The latest emergency medicine research suggests that speed of 
getting a gunshot wound victim to a close-by hospital is more important in many cases 
than the mode of transport or care en route.”132 
There was, however, more problems due to the traffic congestion in the parking 
lot. As Murphy and Crummy explain, “When rescuers from the fire department finally 
arrived at the back of the theater to help some of the most critical patients, they were 
thwarted again by the lack of ambulances for transport.”133 
In the final count for responders for the duration of the incident, “Over 50 
detectives, 150 to 200 police officers, 100 FBI, 25 ATF (were) on scene.”134 As a final 
note to the simple brilliance of improvisation, the responding law enforcement personnel 
had to deal with a crowd of approximately 1,000 people. The TriData report describes, 
“Movie patrons were interviewed as witnesses to the event, not as potential suspects. 
Each was photographed in front of a whiteboard containing their personal information, 
and given a number for further identification.”135 
Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response 
• Unified (joint) command established later than sooner during the 
incident. 
• Eventually the police commander had a fire department liaison on 
site at the command post. 
• Individual police officers were on the radio asking for medical 
assistance without going through the proper channels. 
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• Tactical parking for response vehicles was not performed to open 
roadways in the parking lot. 
• Police on scene within 90 seconds. 
• Incident occurred at shift change allowing for a greater than 
normal police response.  
• Fire/EMS were limited in their ability to get to the patients due to 
crowd, traffic congestion, (to include unattended police cars), 
possible additional shooters, scene not declared safe.  
• Access and egress points were not cleared and kept clear. 
• Communications center was overwhelmed limiting information 
flow, messages misunderstood or not passed on. 
• The police department and the fire department did not use their 
interoperable radio system. 
• The arrest of the subject was not communicated to the FD possibly 
limiting their triage capabilities.  
• PD was concerned about IED devices and moved crowd from 
building.  
• No staging area for mutual aid responders nor was a Staging Area 
officers appointed.  
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• Police were scooping and going with the wounded to the nearest 
medical facilities.  
• FD was on scene and treating patients within 5:30 minutes.  
• Police had transported 19 wounded before the fire/EMS 
transported the first patient. 
• Limited, if any, first aid was administered as the police transported 
the patients. 
• FD had multiple triage locations on scene for treatment and 
transport as well as treatment and release. 
• Officers had no medical equipment in their police cars and had 
little training. 
• It took 52 minutes to have all victims taken to local hospitals 




J. DECEMBER 14, 2012, NEWTOWN, CT, SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY 
On December 14, 2012, at approximately 9:30 AM, Adam Peter Lanza tried the 
front door of Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Finding the door 
locked, he then shot through next to the door and entered the school. Lanza was carrying 
his mother’s Bushmaster XM-15 rifle, a Glock 20 pistol, and a Sig Sauer P226 9 mm 
pistol that was not fired.136 A report by Office of the State’s Attorney Judicial District of 
Danbury states, “It is currently estimated that the time from when the shooter shot his 
way into the school until he took his own life was less than five minutes.”137 In less than 
10 minutes until 9:40 AM, he would kill 26 teachers and students, wound two more, and 
then commit suicide. Lanza had started his killing at home, where he shot his mother as 
she lay in bed. 
Lanza began his shooting by first killing the schools principle and school 
psychologist as they moved to the hallway to investigate the sound of the window being 
shot out. Then, Lanza moved to a first-grade classroom 8. The report by the Office of the 
State’s Attorney Judicial District of Danbury notes, “In all, seventeen people were killed 
in classroom 8. A sixteenth child survived and exited classroom 8 after the police 
arrived.”138 The same report states, “There were a total of eighty expended 5.56 mm 
casings seized from classroom 8.”139 
Lanza entered classroom 10 and shot the children as they hid under desks. The 
Report of the State’s Attorney describes, “Five children were found, with Mrs. Murphy 
partially covering one child. Four of the five children were deceased. One of the five 
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children was transported to the hospital and pronounced dead.”140 It was in classroom 10 
that Lanza fired one shot into his head, killing himself. The same report states, “There 
were forty-nine expended 5.56 mm casings seized.”141 
The report from the Danbury State Attorney’s office was released on December 
14, 2013. The report shows that in the five minutes that the shooter was active until 
ending his own life, he had fired 157 rounds from his Bushmaster rifle, and all victims in 
the classrooms were shot (129 rounds) by 5.56 rounds. The report also stated: 
The Bushmaster was loaded with a 30-round capacity magazine. Fourteen 
rounds were in the magazine when the Bushmaster was recovered by 
police. There was one round in the chamber…Recovered from the person 
of the shooter, in addition to more ammunition for the handguns, were 
three, 30-round magazines for the Bushmaster, each containing 30 rounds. 
Located in the area of the shootings were six additional 30-round 
magazines containing 0, 0, 0, 10, 11, and 13 live rounds respectively.142 
In less than four minutes, officers from the Newtown police department arrived at 
the school. The officers located a male “…running along the east side of SHES with 
something in his hand.”143 Officers believed that there might have been more than one 
shooter. They proceeded into the school five minutes after arrival and four minutes after 
hearing the last shot from inside the school. Table 5, adapted from the State’s Attorney 
report shows the timeline based on the dispatch recordings. It has been speculated that 
upon hearing the police sirens, Lanza ended his life. 
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Table 5.   Lanza case timeline  
First Response Timeline  
Time Event 
9:30 am Shooter is believed to first enter Sandy Hook Elementary School (SHES). 
9:35:39 am First 911 call to Newtown Police is received. 
9:36:06 am 911 dispatcher broadcasts shooting at SHES. 
9:37:38 am Connecticut State Police dispatched to SHES. 
9:39:00 am First Newtown police arrives behind SHES. 
9:39:13 am Two more Newtown officers arrive at SHES. 
9:40:03 am Last shot heard. Believed to be shooter suicide. 
9:42:39 am Newtown police reports shooter’s car license plate. 
9:44:47 am Newtown police officers enter SHES. 
9:46:23 am Connecticut State Police arrive at SHES. 
9:46:48 am Connecticut State Police enter SHES. 
Source: Office of the State’s Attorney Judicial District of Danbury, Report of the State’s Attorney, 
11–12.   
Additional officers begin to arrive and reacted consistent with current training. An 
article in the Huffington Post describes: 
“Upon arrival, teams of Troopers and Officers formed ‘Active Shooter 
Teams’ and immediately entered the school,” Vance said in the release. 
Teams performed rescues of students and staff, removing them to a safe 
location as they searched for the shooting suspect within the building. The 
building was evacuated and students walked hand in hand out to a safe 
location.144 
Also according to Huffington Post article, at Danbury Hospital, “At around 10:30 AM, 
three patients arrived, one after the other. As a fraction of the medical professionals on 
hand swung into action, the rest waited tensely.”145 
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Below is a summation of the response as well as the treatment and evacuation: 
1. Analysis of response 
• Officers made a tactical decision to delay entry in the belief that 
there may have been more than one shooter despite hearing 
gunshots from inside the school. 
• Two command centers were established in separate locations – 
these appeared to be after the incident and utilized for control over 
the family reception area and for the criminal investigation. 
• Staging for incoming medical personnel was at the Newtown fire 
dept. 
• No opportunity to insert EMS into the entry team, it appears that 
no follow-on team was used nor any opportunity to establish a hot/
warm zone triage area. 
• No need for a hot zone triage area in this incident. 
2. Treatment and evacuation time 
• Medics were called for then called off as the building search 
continued. Once the all clear was given a call for “everybody” was 
made then called off with only two units requested at 10:04 AM 
after the scene was evaluated. 
• One ambulance had a patient driven to them by police for transport 
to a local hospital.  
 
K. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
This chapter visited 10 historic active shooter incidents. Each case stood alone in 
its activities and responses, yet each case was a catalyst for future incident responses. 
Law enforcement and fire/EMS responders all learned from these calls, analyzed them, 
and grew from them. In addition, policies and plans were created or modified based on 
them. In some instances, they became the paradigm shift for future responses. What also 
became evident is that responding jurisdictions felt the need to humbly review and 
prepare formal after action reports that became public knowledge and demonstrated a 
teachable moment in the sorrow and tragedy to others. There is no doubt that these 
“lessons learned” reports contribute to the betterment of future tactical field responders.  
71 
In the next chapter, we shall look at the responders again and begin with the 
military historic data and that studies have been produced. We will move on to EMS and 
law enforcement and the changes occurring within each discipline.  
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VI. THE RESPONDERS 
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which 
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
uncertainty….  
— Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
 
This chapter starts with information from military studies, moves to the EMS 
discipline, and finishes with the law enforcement side. In both the EMS and law 
enforcement portions of this chapter, the military will continue to be the foundation for 
these two civilian responder disciplines. This chapter also includes an introduction to the 
concept of bringing a co-entry component to active shooter incidents where security 
teams of law enforcement are provided to secure a location for the medics to begin their 
collection of patients, triage analysis, staging and transportation from the initial scene to a 
general transport area outside the hot zone. 
There are a number of issues that must be recognized prior to any discussion 
concerning an active shooter incident. Like many responder calls for service, the incident 
is in progress; traffic crashes, fires, robberies, medical calls, for example. In an active 
shooter incident, there are a number of variables:  
• the incident is in progress, there are wounded or dead,  
• the location is probably not intimately known by the responders, 
• the number of active shooters are unknown or nebulous as well as 
descriptions,  
• the specific subject(s) location is unknown as the shooter(s) are possibly 
mobile,  
• the weapons used are unknown.  
In addition to these factors is the dynamic thought patterns of the responders as 
they close in on the site, their “fog of war.” As the responders are moving toward the 
location, traffic and the never-ending updates from the radio from dispatch and other 
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responding units are also concerns the responders bear in mind. A partial list, in no 
particular order, includes: 
• the best way to arrive quickly and safely; 
• what additional units are responding, from what locations and their travel 
time; 
• based on what is known presently what is the best location for tactical 
entry, staging, perimeter, the initial command post; 
• based on what I presently know are my tools sufficient; 
• based on what I presently know, are there sufficient resources responding; 
and  
• what additional resources and assets are available at this time or may be 
needed to mitigate this initial response 
The one thing that allows the responders to make these decisions in this less than 
perfect scenario is that they are trained and have practiced or responded to similar 
incidents in the past. The initial key requirement of this type incident is neutralization of 
the threat(s). Once that is accomplished, if the incident is a mass casualty event, then 
other requirements include: rescue and eventually recovery, patient transport and 
accountability, crowd control for interviews of victims, witnesses and scene preservation, 
and evidence recovery. Having worked as a police field supervisor as a sergeant, 
lieutenant, and captain, I have observed that responding units are very good at sizing up 
situations, assuming proper tasks, and needs analysis with minimal supervision. Based on 
their training and experience, responders work by what can best be described as auto-
pilot. That is to say, that each knows her or his jobs, assumes these tasks readily and with 
command and control in place, and performs competently and professionally. As in all 
emerging scenarios and certainly in a complex incident such as an active shooter, certain 
“nudges to the rudder” occur but the response with be generally based on in-place 
procedures and directives. What must remain on the mind of everyone involved is that 
information flow is vital. Von Clausewitz explains:  
But the commander in war must commit the business he has in hand to a 
corresponding space which his eye cannot survey, which the keenest zeal 
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cannot always explore, and with which, owing to the constant changes 
taking place, he can also seldom become properly acquainted.146 
A. THE MILITARY 
The medicine practiced today by the U.S. military on battlefields around the 
world continues to evolve and has become the leading method taught to civilian trauma 
centers here in the United States. In a September 2009 presentation entitled, “Battlefield 
Trauma: Lessons from Afghanistan,” Jim Holliman addresses the injuries of battle and 
the changes that have occurred as a result of improvements in medicine, treatment in the 
field and the ability to get the wounded to more advanced medical treatment (see  
Figure 6). 
 Historical comparison  Figure 6. 
Historical Comparison : U.S. 
Military Medical Experience
Death Rates After Wounding :
• Revolutionary War : 42 %
• World War II : 30 %
• Korean War : ~25 %
• Vietnam War : ~25 %
• Persian Gulf War : ~25 %
• Global War on Terrorism : < 10 %
 
Source: Jim Holliman, “Battlefield Trauma: Lessons from Afghanistan” [Power Point], 2009, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=Jim+Holliman%2C+Battlefield+Trauma%3A+ 
Lessons+from+Afghanistan%2C+2009&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8.  
With the wounding of our career military and our “citizen soldiers,” the National 
Guard units deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, the treatment of traumatic injuries from 
explosives and gunfire are a school for the various medical personnel who deploy and 
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then return home to fill their civilian jobs. Battlefield doctors, nurses, and medics take 
what is learned on the battlefield and transpose it to everyday life in the emergency 
rooms and trauma centers around the country. In addition to the medical personnel who 
are developing their skills are the countless soldiers who return home and assume their 
roles as law enforcement, paramedics, and firefighters. The skill sets learned in war are 
conveyed over to civilian responders who deal with traumatic injuries here at home. 
These skills learned by our citizen soldiers are then being taught to their civilian 
counterparts who work alongside them in the various responder fields.  
To further the discussion of using military casual care knowledge, we must turn to 
Somalia. Following the 1993 battle for Mogadishu, both the Naval Special Warfare 
Command and the Special Operations Command began studying tactical combat casualty 
care (TCCC). According to an article by Cain, “Conventional civilian medicine was not 
appropriate for optimizing casualty care within the tactical environment.”147 Because of 
the Naval Special Warfare Command and the Special Operations Command studies, the 
concept of TCCC guidelines were written and continue to undergo changes as needed. It 
is on this basis that the care and treatment of injuries has been adopted in the civilian 
community for pre-hospital care in the field. As can be seen in Holliman’s presentation in 
Figure 6 and discussed below, the first concern of the TCCC program is based on the 
control of bleeding. Of note in the slide Figure 7 is the last sentence: “These same 
priorities would apply to civilian mass casualty situations [emphasis added].”148 
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 TCCC priorities149 Figure 7. 
Battlefield Lessons : First Life-
Saving Priorities in the Field
• Stop external bleeding
– Tourniquets have proven safe and effective
• Decompress tension pneumothorax in 
the severely dyspneic patient
• Insert nasopharyngeal airway in the 
unconscious patient
These same priorities would apply to 
civilian mass casualty situations
 
Source: Holliman, “Battlefield Trauma: Lessons from Afghanistan.” 
Medics on the battlefield have found that the use of tourniquets, long thought to 
be a bad idea in the field, were in fact saving lives. Coupled with newer types of pressure 
bandages, tourniquets continue to prove themselves under battle conditions. Additionally, 
the use of hemostatic powder agents and treated gauze materials to assist in the clotting 
of the wounds has surfaced and being used in the field, both in combat and in the civilian 
world. Further studies, according to Cain’s article, recommend to “…utilize Combat 
Gauze as the primary hemostatic agent, with WoundStat as the backup or when the 
wound characteristics are more amenable to a granular agent.”150 Cain goes on to discuss 
airway and breathing needs and needle thoracostomy (simply strategically placing a 
needle into the chest cavity to release oxygen surrounding a damaged chest causing a 
tension pneumothorax, a condition that prohibits the lung to inflate due to the air from the 
wound encasing the lung). The needle procedure allows the restricting air to vent thus 
allowing the lung to expand and the patient to breathe more easily. According to TCCC 
practices, next, the responder should address circulation issues, specifically hypovolemic 
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shock, which is described by the National Institutes of Health as “… an emergency 
condition in which severe blood and fluid loss make the heart unable to pump enough 
blood to the body.” 151  The final step in the TCCC initiative is the evacuation and 
transport of the patient from the military field of battle to more advanced medical 
facilities.  
During the 2013 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conference, 
Dr. Alexander Eastman from Dallas Police Department stated, “TCCC overview job is to 
make sure that the casualties get to the hospital alive so they can benefit from it.”152 As 
pointed out by Mark E. Gibbons at the Region II EMS Director’s Association Conference 
in November 2012, “The goals of TCCC are 1. Treat the casualty, 2. Prevent additional 
casualties and 3. Complete the mission.”153 It is with this concept that the mission of a 
combined task force response has become a viable way to respond to active shooter 
incidents.  
In an article written for The Tactical Edge in the winter, 2010 edition, Dr. 
Matthew Sztajnkrycer notes, “Experience gained during combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan indicates that TCCC has saved countless lives in a forward operating 
environment.”154 Also in his article, Sztajnkrycer quotes from military data, “…61% of 
all preventable combat deaths are due to bleeding to death from isolated extremity 
trauma.”155 This provides the foundation for his argument that the control of external 
hemorrhaging is to precede airway control. This treatment is the application is some sort 
of tourniquet. Sztajnkrycer does caution, “Based upon the available data, however, the 
                                                 
151 U.S. National Library of Medicine, s.v. “Hypovolemic Shock,” Medical Encyclopedia, 2015, 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000167.htm.   
152 Personal notes from IACP Conference.  
153 Mark E. Gibbons, “Applying Combat Medicine to Civilian EMS Operations” (presentation to the 
Region II EMS Director’s Association Conference, Gatlinburg, TN, November 2012), 
http://www.r2ems.com/pdf/conference_presentations/
2012//applying%20combat%20medicine%20to%20civilian%20ems%20operations%202012%20v2.2.pdf.  
154 Matthew Sztajnkrycer, “Learning from Tragedy: Preventing Officer Deaths with Medical 
Interventions,” The Tactical Edge (Winter 2010): 54.     
155 Ibid., 55.  
79 
focus of TCCC on control of life-threatening extremity hemorrhage may be over-
emphasized in the law enforcement setting.”156  
Addressing the immediate needs of those who have been injured in an active 
shooter attack, while the situation is still not under control and the attackers are not 
isolated, contained, or eliminated, presents its own problems for law enforcement 
responders. During that time, the only possible medical intervention permitted to 
responding officers who are intent approaching the source of gunfire is to provide 
direction to those who are injured or who are able to assist themselves or others. These 
directions fall under one simple TCCC rule, “…the immediate need to control severe 
extremity hemorrhage above all other procedures. It is the only medical procedure to be 
considered during the care under fire phase of tactical medical management.”157 
As can be seen from Figure 8, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the U.S. casualty survival rate has improved 
dramatically since World War II and Vietnam.  
We can see that the performance of the medical personnel, the attention of “battle-
field buddies,” or even self-treatment, has the ability to increase the life chances of the 
injured. This treatment seems to be minimally sufficient for the physical trauma inflicted 
on a shooting victim to possibly sustain them until more advanced skills can address the 
injuries.  
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 Comparison of statistics for battle casualties, 1941–2005158 Figure 8. 
Comparison of Statistics for 
Battle Casualties, 1941-2005
Holcomb et al  J Trauma 2006
World War II Vietnam OIF/OEF
CFR 19.1% 15.8% 9.4%
Note: CFR is the Case Fatality Rate – the
percent of those wounded who die
The U.S. casualty survival rate in Iraq and Afghanistan 
has been the best in U.S. history.
 
Source: Mark E. Gibbons, “Applying Combat Medicine to Civilian EMS Operations,” 
presentation to the Region II EMS Director’s Association, Fall Conference, November 2012.  
B. EMS RESPONSE  
As this paper explores the ability to combine a police and fire/EMS response in an 
active shooter incident, a look at the EMS role is critical for understanding. There has 
been a recognized need for trained medical personnel to get to the wounded as quickly as 
possible; however, historic protocol has halted the entry of EMS until the law 
enforcement has declared the scene safe. Over the last few years, this protocol has begun 
to change to one in which medical personnel are moved closer to the scene and in many 
cases are incorporated into a follow-up team entering behind the initial law enforcement 
initial personnel.  
In January 2013, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) published a 
document entitled Firefighter Life Safety Initiative 12 (FLSI 12). The intent of this 
document is to advocate for national protocols for use by firefighters as they respond to 
incidents involving violence. The document is very specific in its attempt to not define 
“violent incidents” and thus place limits and restrictions on the definition. Within the 
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document, it is clear that the definition of such a term is nebulous and fits into a wide 
category of incidents. This foresight by the writers provides sufficient room to adapt an 
even broader strategy to the “all hazards” approach in various other situations.159  
Among the items noted in the FLSI 12, 2007 summit is to:  
Require all Law Enforcement responders that may be responding to a 
violent incident in your community to use an Incident Management 
System (IMS); Fire department personnel should communicate, face to 
face, with the law enforcement personnel on scene.160  
Without exception, these two items are critical to a proper response to any 
situation but even more so in a response to violent encounter. Command and control and 
“battlespace” knowledge is critical to a successful operation. Chaos is rampant in such 
situations, and it is necessary for responders to get control of such a situation and quickly 
as possible. This is accomplished by responders’ knowledge of their counterparts in the 
police or fire discipline. This familiarity is built in training and fieldwork and develops a 
level of trust and a willingness to work together.  
The 2007 report from the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation also points out, 
“Fire departments should work with other agencies to develop and implement joint SOPs/
SOGs for all emergency response personnel (fire, law enforcement, EMS) and 
dispatchers, including the use of an effective incident management system.” 161  The 
premise of this document falls in line with the guidelines of the National Response Plan 
and the directives of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). In the 
HSPD-5, the president called for, “coordination structures, capabilities, and resources 
into a unified, all discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
management.”162 In the 2008 change to the National Response Framework, this directive 
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did not change. Responders to emergencies, from all disciplines and levels, must be 
capable of working together and should plan on doing so.  
In a 2013 article entitled, “L.A. Fire Department Dramatically Overhauls 
Response to Shootings,” writers Robert Lopez and Ben Walsh point out that there is a 
dramatic change in how firefighters and paramedics respond to active shooters. The city 
of Los Angeles is now directing that:   
Paramedics and firefighters, protected by armed law enforcement teams, 
rapidly enter potentially dangerous areas during active shooting incidents 
to treat victims and get them enroute to hospital trauma centers.163  
This change, already in the planning stages, came about more quickly due to the 
incident at Los Angeles airport, a month earlier, in which a gunman shot and wounded a 
number of people, including Transportation Security Administration officer Gerardo I. 
Hernandez. It was later determined that Officer Hernandez had sustained numerous fatal 
wounds from the 12 gunshots he sustained; however, direction for responders has now 
become, move to the wounded under protection and begin triage and treatment while still 
in the “hot zone” but guarded by armed officers. It is this type of response plan, known as 
a rescue task force, consistent with the NIMS definition of a task force: “A combination 
of single resources assembled for a particular tactical need with common 
communications and a Leader,”164 in this case, law enforcement and fire/EMS. 
The NFFF paper uses a deadly encounter in Lexington, Kentucky as an example 
of need for the safety of the responders. Fire Lieutenant (Lt) Brenda Cowan had 
responded to a medical aid call, and police were dispatched to the same location for a 
possible shooting. As she attended to the women victims, Lt Cowan was shot along with 
another responder. A responding police officer succeeded in using his vehicle as a 
barricade and cover. Lt Cowan was finally moved 45 minutes later by a police tactical 
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team.165 Because of this and a firefighter killed in 2004, responders in Lexington have 
adopted a four-tier model of response. 
In a September 2013 paper published by the U.S. Fire Administration, entitled 
Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for 
Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents, it advocates the key issue that needs to be 
addressed nationally is  
Local jurisdictions must build sufficient public safety resources to handle 
AS/MCI scenarios. Local fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and 
law enforcement (LE) must have common tactics, communications 
capabilities and terminology to have seamless, effective operations.166  
It is becoming critical that the public safety responders plan and prepare for mass 
casualty events.  
Arlington County, Virginia is one of many locations agencies across the country 
that has moved to such a program. As defined in Arlington County Fire Department’s 
standard operating procedure F 28/Category 1, “The Rescue Task Force (RTF) is a set of 
teams deployed to provide point of wound care to victims where there is an on-going 
ballistic or explosive threat.”167 This policy dictates that the EMS personnel will be in 
protective ballistic equipment and under the protection of the police department. Fairfax 
County, Virginia has also initiated such a plan under the 2011 Unified Hostile Incident 
Action Guide,168 co-written by both fire and law enforcement personnel. 
In their 2004 article, “EMS Response to Columbine: Lessons Learned,” Mell and 
Sztajnkrycer note:   
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In all, one hundred and sixty persons were triaged by Fire and EMS 
personnel, 24 of whom had serious injuries. These patients were triaged in 
one of four different sites. Many mutual aid ambulances and EMS 
personnel were on scene. As a result, prioritizing patients for transport was 
far easier than would otherwise be expected.169  
Mell and Sztajnkrycer continue, “…can EMS begin rescue operations 
simultaneous with SWAT or EOD team activities? Without training as members of these 
specific teams, the answer is traditionally ‘no.’”170 The article concludes, “The presence 
of TEMS during the attack would have mitigated the need for SWAT operators to extract 
the wounded to R13’s location for initial care and stabilization.”171 As we are beginning 
to see now, this is not true. Historically, SWAT medics are part of the team and remain 
with the team during its operation. They will not stop to assist injured until the tactical 
mission is complete. 
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT  
Based on the methods employed by our military in combat areas, the law 
enforcement profession is adopting tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) procedures. 
What is the difference between TCCC and hospital case, it is explained by Sztajnkrycer, 
“In contrast to traditional civilian pre-hospital care, TCCC de-emphasizes airway 
management and protecting the cervical spine, instead prioritizing the use of tourniquets 
for control of life-threatening extremity bleeding.”172  
Officers may be the first on a scene and may be the first to render aid to the 
injured. In addition, they may also be engaged in a gun battle where medical personnel 
are not able to enter the area for safety reasons. The officers must be able to rely on 
themselves and the others around them to initiate self or buddy aide or assist a wounded 
civilian.  
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Using data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program for the Years 1998–2007, 173 
Sztajnkrycer compiled the information seen in Table 6, that indicates that the greatest 
cause of injury was by handgun and the greatest location of injury was head and chest 
trauma. Sztajnkrycer notes, “The most commonly identified causes of death were head 
trauma (198 victim officers) and chest trauma (90 victim officers). 123 deaths were 
identified as being potentially preventable.” The article also points out that the term 
potentially preventable meant, “In the absence of definitive medical or forensic data, a 
death was considered potentially preventable if the fatal injury provided the opportunity 
to either perform a TCCC skill set lifesaving intervention or definitive airway 
management.”174  
Table 6.   Weapons used 
 
Source: Sztajnkrycer, “Learning from Tragedy.” 
Law enforcement personnel are trained to move to the sound of gunfire and 
mitigate that threat through any number of means. What law enforcement has not been 
trained to do, until recently, is stop and address the issue of the injured during a gunfight 
when sufficient forces are on scene to mitigate that threat. This thesis proposes that 
additional training for law enforcement be supplied to work in this vein of response. In 
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fact, many agencies are moving toward this type of framework as it relates to active 
shooter scenarios. Sztajnkrycer refers to a paper written by Ronald F Bellamy entitled, 
“The Causes of Death in Conventional Land Warfare: Implications for Combat Casualty 
Care Research,” for Military Medicine in 1984. Sztajnkrycer, in his Learning from 
Tragedy paper, adapts Bellamy’s information into the chart for causes as seen in Figure 
9.175  
 Location of potentially preventable police officer deaths Figure 9. 
 
Source: Sztajnkrycer, “Learning from Tragedy.” 
By issuing officers tourniquets and pressure dressings, officers are able to self-
treat or treat a fellow officer in some cases. At best, in an active shooter incident, they 
could be able to assist the injured if the situation is contained or mitigated in another area 
of the response location. Figure 10 shows the causes of preventable death in combat. The 
military relies on planning for combat operations, and as such part of the briefings 
provided by supervisors to team members contain a number of items: if things go wrong 
and we must withdraw where is the rally point, and if officers are wounded where do we 
collect the casualties?  
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 Causes of preventable death in combat Figure 10. 
 
Source: Sztajnkrycer, “Learning from Tragedy.” 
Knowledge of these two locations (where to rally and where to collect casualties) 
provide points of gathering for accountability, triage of the injured, weapons and 
ammunition storage, treatment of the injured, and further planning action. Law 
enforcement needs to learn that responding to any situation where there are injured falls 
within their responsibilities. As George Williams puts it, “By viewing it (an active 
shooter call) as a public safety event, the dramatic benefits of an integrated response with 
police and fire working synergistically can be achieved.”176  
Officers need to understand the use of the casualty collection point (CCP) and the 
value it serves when responding to an incident such as an active shooter call. Simply put, 
a CCP is a location that casualty are safely located at to begin triage and treatment while 
still in the field and prior to casualty transport to a medical facility. Law enforcement 
officers are familiar with the concept if they have ever dealt with a large fight or a multi-
car accident that may involve numerous injuries. Generally, as first on the scene, law 
enforcement establishes these areas automatically and directs the medics to these 
locations so they can begin their jobs. The issue then becomes how law enforcement gets 
the casualties and the EMS personnel together. In either the large fight or a multi-car 
accident scene, it is relatively easy; however, execution of that concept in an active 
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shooter situation raises a new set of concerns—continuing safety for the injured and 
additional safety for the EMS personnel.  
On January 8, 2011, Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was speaking to a small 
crowd in the parking lot of a Safeway grocery store outside of Tucson, Arizona in Pima 
County. At 10:11 A.M, a lone gunman opened fire, fired 30 rounds, and struck 19 people, 
including Congresswoman Giffords. Medics arrived within minutes but were held back 
by the police for 12 minutes until the scene could be declared safe. However, what was 
unusual about the scene is that the on-scene deputies, who had received advanced 
training, were treating the wounded “…MCI (mass casualty incidents) and advanced care 
procedures…. they treated 10 of the 19 injured patients… The first seven patients were 
triaged, treated and transported from the scene by 10:35 AM. All were transported by 
11:01 AM.”177 
With the potential of an extended response by EMS personnel due to distance, 
traffic, other priority calls, or hostile scenes where EMS may not enter by protocol, the 
use of law enforcement officers as trained first aid providers seems to make sense. 
Falling back on the precedence establish by military battle field care, more law 
enforcement agencies are beginning to include more advanced combat wound training as 
part of  their training because it is not unusual for law enforcement to be the first on scene 
for major traffic collisions or tactical situations. For instance, Pima County has created a 
program, the “First Five Minutes,” “to combat the three most common causes of 
preventable traumatic death: 1) hemorrhage in accessible and controllable regions; 2) 
hemorrhage in inaccessible or uncontrollable areas; and 3) airway/respiratory 
management.”178 Pima County also provides officers with the equipment to complete 
these tasks. 
What is important to remember is that there is always a life-safety component for 
a law enforcement response on every call officers respond to, if not for a citizen then for 
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another officer, responder, or finally for themselves. Knowledge of treatment is, in the 
last instance, a truly potential lifesaver. 
In a 2014 article written by Elana Gordon, “Philly Police’s ‘Scoop and Run’ 
Policy May Benefit Most Severely Injured,” she points out that the city of Philadelphia 
has had a standing policy that police officers are permitted and encouraged to bring 
seriously injured people to the hospitals in their cars rather than take the time and wait on 
a responding ambulance. According to Gordon, this policy has been in effect for over 20 
years and goes on to explain that Dr. Roger Band and some colleagues at the University 
of Pennsylvania hospital wanted to see if this policy has had any effect on the patient’s 
outcome. The group reviewed the city’s record of trauma patients between 2003 and 
2007, some 4,122 patients, and they  
didn’t find any major difference in overall adjusted mortality rates for 
patients transported by police versus EMS; and …When zeroing in on 
those with the most severe injuries. Band’s group found police actually 
“did a little bit better in some of the more critical injured subgroups of 
patients.”179  
Gordon also noted in the article, “The findings echo a citywide study conducted in the 
mid-1980s.”180 
After Columbine, law enforcement officers examined new ways to address issues 
such as they encountered. The immediate deployment into the active shooting zone is 
such a tactic. Law enforcement officers are now taught to not wait for SWAT but to enter 
the scene and begin to hunt for the shooter. Of concern is the need to neutralize the 
attacker(s) and allow medical attention to begin as fast as possible. Another concern is 
the possibility of a suicide type attack where the attackers do not care about taking 
hostages but rather try to kill as many as they can. David Cullen, author of “The Four 
Most Important Lessons of Columbine” has stated, “The active protocol has proved 
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successful at numerous shootings during the past decade. At Virginia Tech alone, it 
probably saved dozens of lives.”181 
Tactical medicine in a combat zone is different and will continue to be terribly 
different that tactical medicine encountered by law enforcement and fire/EMS at home. 
However, what is the same are many of the wounds sustained by the injured citizens that 
are encountered by these first responders. From a responder standpoint in an active 
shooter scenario, law enforcement must first mitigate the dangers to prevent further 
injury, permit medical personnel to reach the victims to begin treatment, evacuate, and 
transport the victims. Utilizing the military concept of medicine under fire, law 
enforcement officers can continue their mission while assisting medical personnel into a 
“safe” environment to begin to perform their critical job. Together, these two responder 
entities can become a single responding unit working in harmony, as we shall see in the 
next chapter.  
 
                                                 




VII. MODELS OF RESPONSE  
This chapters explains some of the predominate methodologies for dealing with 
active shooter incidents. An attempt has been made to place them in some chronological 
order; however, the concepts build on each other and co-mingle. They incorporate 
discipline specific methods for both law enforcement tactical training and EMS suggested 
protocols. Additionally, the reader can see that many are interdisciplinary based to 
provide a combined response into an active shooter hot zone in which each responder 
discipline is able to conduct its specific operations while co-mingled. The strength to 
these models is that they grow in concepts daily and have and will work in a combined 
response planning setting and in actual incidents—not only for active shooter incidents 
but also for any mass casualty scene. 
A. ENTER, EVALUATE, EVACUATE  
The change in response to active shooters has begun to stress the need to reach the 
victims in a quicker fashion. As a result, the 2013 Hartford Consensus advocates what is 
known as enter, evaluate, evacuate (3 ECHO). According to a Mayo Clinic report:  
The 3 ECHO training focuses on establishing secure, safe corridors for 
firefighters and EMS to enter so they can rapidly assess, stabilize and 
evacuate injured people to a safe area. It’s based on the understanding that 
most people who are shot or injured die of blood loss and that time is of 
the essence.182 
With a rapid response to shooting situations and 3 ECHO training, lives can be 
saved. In her article, Laura Adelmann points out,  
As officers arrive on scene, they immediately enter the school instead of 
waiting for backup and begin hunting for the shooter. Police also establish 
                                                 




and secure safe corridors for firefighters and paramedics to enter and 
evacuate injured people even while the shooter is still active.183 
The shift to a 3 ECHO procedure has come about over time. Support for a change in 
procedures, which includes 3 ECHO, has been based on the response to the Columbine 
shooting in 1999. Police procedures at the time dictated that responding officers establish 
and secure a containment perimeter and wait for SWAT officers to arrive. At Columbine, 
this policy led to a highly publicized death of one of the teachers, William “Dave” 
Sanders, who bled to death in a classroom despite the students alerting the responders 
that he was injured and bleeding to death. It took the responders hours to get to him 
during which time he died. According to an article in Fire Chief:  
Having survived the initial assault, the severely wounded Sanders 
retreated to an area inside the school, barricaded himself with his students 
inside a classroom and waited for help. He later died. The after-action 
report noted that tactical medics could have made a difference.184 
B. TACTICAL EMERGENCY MEDICINE SERVICES  
The consideration for medical support to a law enforcement tactical team began in 
1989.  
In 1989 representatives from law enforcement, emergency medicine, and 
prehospital EMS gathered to develop consensus on the provision of 
medical support to SWAT teams. The National Tactical Officers 
Association issued a position statement in 1993 supporting Tactical 
Emergency Medical Support as “an important element of tactical law 
enforcement operations. The National Association of EMS Physicians 
further described medical support of law enforcement special operations in 
a 2001 position paper.185 
                                                 
183 Laura Adelmann, “Lakeville School District Staff Train for Active Shooter,” Sun This Week, 
September 5, 2013, http://sunthisweek.com/2013/09/05/lakeville-school-district-staff-train-active-shooter/.  
184 Bruce Evans, “The Time for Tactical Medics Has Arrived,” Fire Chief 53, no. 6 (2009): 20, 
http://firechief.com/ems-training/time-tactical-medics-has-arrived.   
185 Nelson Tang, and Gabor D. Kelen, “Role of Tactical EMS Support of Public Safety and the Public 
Health Response to a Hostile Mass Casualty Incident,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 
supplement 1 (2007): s55, s55–s56.    
93 
According to Heck, Isakov, and Bozeman:  
The typical uniform worn by EMS personnel will not provide the personal 
protection necessary to function safely in a tactical law enforcement 
environment. ... Furthermore, standard EMS protocols prohibit entry of 
traditional providers into unsecured, threatening environments.186  
The issue therefore becomes how medical care is provided in a still active scene when the 
tactically trained medics remain with the tactical teams either on scene or responding but 
not yet on scene. 
In a presentation for the National Collegiate Emergency Medical Services 
Foundation (NCEMSF), Dr. David W. Callaway describes the tactical emergency 
medicine services (TEMS) concept, “TEMS is an out of hospital system of care dedicated 
to enhancing the probability of special operations law enforcement mission success and 
promoting public safety.” 187  The origination of the TEMS concept began with the 
military after the battle of Mogadishu in Somalia. It is based on the TCCC concept and 
provides the capabilities of tactically trained field medics assigned and trained with the 
civilian law enforcement tactical teams. The purpose of the TEMS personnel is to provide 
medical assistance to the “team members, victims/hostages, bystanders, perpetrators.”188 
C. TACTICAL EMERGENCY CASUALTY CARE 
As we have noted in prior sections and chapters of this thesis, the military has 
played a significant role in the development of medical responses during battle. Arlington 
County, Virginia has trained its firefighter/EMTs and all of its police officers in tactical 
combat casualty care (TECC) to give aid to the injured as quickly as possible. The 
foundation of TECC was the military’s TCCC program.  
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In April 2013, a one-day conference was held in Hartford, Connecticut involving 
law enforcement, fire/EMS, military, and civilian medical personnel. The purpose of this 
conference was to determine a strategy of response for active shooter incidents. Relying 
on military and civilian data, the conference produced a paper called “Improving Survival 
from Active Shooter Events,” which is designed “to promote local, state, and national 
policies to improve survival in these uncommon, but horrific events.”189 
According to the Hartford Consensus meeting:  
Military experience has shown that the number one cause of preventable 
death in victims of penetrating trauma is hemorrhage. Tactical Combat 
Casualty Care (TCCC) programs, when implemented with strong 
leadership support, have produced dramatic reductions in preventable 
death.190  
According to Scott and Schwartz, “TCCC was first introduced to the military in the mid-
1990s, and has drastically reduced preventable battlefield deaths due to trauma in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.”191  
It seems foolish not to have training for both fire and law enforcement in the field. 
Isolated police units in rural areas would be able to assist the injured rather than waiting 
for responding medics. Mass casualty incidents could be addressed more quickly and 
scenarios of active shooters certainly could. The shooting of Gabriel Gifford on January 
8, 2011 is another example of the TECC program. The officers on scene at the time of the 
shooting secured the gunman, secured the scene, and began treating the injured. The 
responding EMS personnel were held off to stage until the officers on scene were sure 
that the scene was secure and there were no additional threats. 
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On November 29, 2009, the Journal of Emergency Medical Service (JEMS), 
published an electronic article entitled, “Arlington County, VA, Task Force Rethinks 
Active Shooter Incident Response—Task Force Represents a New Medical Response 
Model to Active Shooter Incidents.” In the article Smith and Iselin report that the 
formation of the TECC concept was based on wound data. They explain:   
TCCC is evidence based and well supported by combat data. The Wound 
Data and Munitions Effectiveness Team study (1967–1969) examined 
combat wounds from the Vietnam War and found that approximately 20% 
of all soldiers killed in action died from extremity hemorrhage, tension 
pneumothorax or airway obstruction, all of which are readily treatable in 
the field without extensive equipment or medical support.192  
As blood loss is the greatest threat in combat as it is in the civilian world, TECC 
teaches that control of the hemorrhaging is the first priority followed by airway, which is 
a direct opposite in the civilian medical world. The authors also advocate the use of field 
tourniquets for civilian wounds because evacuation can be rather quick. They also agree 
that for non-exsanguinating bleeding, where a tourniquet may not be applied, that the use 
of blood clotting agents or “hemostatic agents, such as Celox, QuikClot ACS, and 
HemCon, in conjunction with direct pressure”193 can be used. Law enforcement can also 
have its knowledge and capabilities expanded by understand a simple triage method. A 
TriData report states:  
With time-tested triage methods including START, (START=Simple 
Triage and Rapid Treatment, while Jump START is the pediatric version) 
Jump START, or other recognized methods; law enforcement officers 
should be able to conduct basic triage in hazardous environments.194 
In what is a growing decision, police officers are being equipped with personal 
first aid kits to address the possibility of officers themselves becoming victims of gunshot 
wounds or the need to assist a fellow officer. Furthermore, officers have the discretion of 
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using the kits on civilian wounded. Depending on the items in the kit, the cost for 
contents and carrier is generally under $100.00 each. While I was at the West Palm 
Beach, Florida, police department, I assisted in upgrading our trauma kits for 
approximately $75.00 each. In addition, we provided a block of training during our 
annual 40-hour in-service training to all officers and equipped each officer with one of 
the kits. To culminate the training week, on the fourth day, the officers participated in an 
active shooter Sims scenario to incorporate all that they had learned during the training.  
TECC has made such a strong impact across the country that Drs. E. Reed Smith 
and David W. Callaway co-chair the Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care. 
According to the Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care, “The TECC 
initiative was undertaken in order to advance the practice of trauma care in the 
prehospital civilian environment. To accomplish this, the guidelines are freely available 
to all.”195 
D. SWARMING 
The concept of “swarming” is a two-edged sword. In his thesis, Moody speaks of 
the Mumbai attack and defines the term as:  
The emergent paradigm envisions multiple terrorist teams armed with 
assault rifles, military explosives and IEDs attacking civilians in public 
places. Such tactics are known as ‘swarming’ and are becoming all too 
common among terrorist organizations worldwide (Arquilla, 2010).196  
Whereas in his paper for the RAND corporation, Sean Edwards gives a definition of 
swarming when he states, “For the purposes of this monograph, a swarming case is any 
historical example in which the scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of 
five (or more) semi-autonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some 
particular place.”197 
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In scenarios of active shooters in a large footprint, such as a school or office 
complex, the age-old tactic of swarming comes into play when multiple law enforcement 
teams enter the target buildings using speed and surprise in a coordinated assault to 
overwhelm the perpetrators with superior forces and defeat the assailant(s) by 
overwhelming their decision cycle or what is known as their ability to observe, orient, 
decide, and act (OODA loop). Murgado explains the OODA loop:  
The OODA loop was created by Air Force colonel John Boyd in the late 
1950s. He was a Korean War fighter pilot and a student of combative 
engagements… Boyd studied the aerial combat outcomes during the 
Korean War and found that even though U.S. pilots flew inferior jets they 
still beat their adversaries 10–1. Through further research, he was able to 
decode the process and learn some critical characteristics about decision-
making and reaction time. Boyd concluded that there were only two ways 
to beat someone in aerial combat: speed up your decision-making (and 
thus reaction time) or slow down theirs.198  
The concept of a tactical swarm is based on the ability of multiple teams to enter a 
large area and concentrate on their individual assigned areas. As French explains, “using 
a pincer movement (encircle and trap any subjects inside their cordon) and ultimately 
containing him from several directions.”199 French also discusses bees and wolf attacks. 
For example, bees can attack from their hive, in multiple waves, from all areas of the 
compass and concentrate on a single target.   
Each entry team is a small element that has a command and control supervisor, 
organic security, and entry officers to search their assigned areas quickly for the 
shooter(s) and to provide intelligence for any medical needs within their area. Rescue 
task force teams can then be deployed as needed. The swarm team continues to move 
rapidly through the area, and the team is tasked as needed when it becomes available. As 
the mission progresses, a request can then be made through the chain of command for a 
security team to oversee the cleared area. 
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One issue of concern while using a swarm tactic is the potential for police-on-
police (blue-on-blue) engagement. Command and control of the team leaders must be 
very tight and brief before deploying the teams to let them know that they have other law 
enforcement close to them. Additionally, the tasking orders must be very specific and 
clear with absolute delineation as to deployment locations and responsibilities. When 
there are multiple agencies involved in an incident response, each agency is designated an 
operational area and specific mission within that area, such as a particular building, a set 
of floors, or specific area of a complex. The benefit to isolating different agencies is that 
they can communicate to each other on their respective radio frequencies for updates as 
well as to the unified command post (CP). Communications via radio back to the CP is 
necessary so that the CP can update all units in the field as needed with intelligence, 
information, and changes in swarm team locations as needed. 
E. RESCUE TASK FORCE 
Under the definitions in ICS, the term task force is notes as, “A combination of 
mixed resources with common communications operating under the direct supervision of 
a Task Force Leader.” 200  In this case, mixed resources would be law enforcement 
security personnel combined with EMS personnel. As the purpose of the task force would 
be to locate and treat the injured, the team leader may be the lead or senior medic and the 
senior law enforcement officer as an advisor. In this way, multiple teams could be placed 
into the incident for multiple rescue operations. The International Association of Fire 
Fighters issued a position paper in June 2013 concerning the training for EMS personnel. 
It states, “…training for all EMS providers should include Tactical Emergency Casualty 
Care (TECC) concepts and practical skills applications.”201 
In 2008, Dr. E. Reed Smith was attending an active shooter incident training 
scenario in Arlington County, Virginia as the Arlington County Fire Department’s 
operational medical director. The law enforcement component did its job; it tracked 
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located and neutralized the shooter yet the medical component was still outside. Dr. 
Smith observed,  
Two hours later, we were still staged, and most of the injured were still 
inside. We could see injured people, but we couldn’t go in and get them. 
Myself and the special operations chief said, “This is ridiculous. We can’t 
just stand around. Why are we not moving in? The threat has been 
mitigated.”202  
The Arlington plan is simple. Four officers enter the location in search of the 
shooter, and a second team of four officers enter the building and begin searches for 
additional shooters and/or improvised explosive devices in a room-by-room plan. A task 
force team of two medics and two officers follows the second team into a cleared area to 
begin the triage assessments and immediate treatment to stabilize the injured. An internal 
casualty collection point is established for transport out of the safety zone. Evacuation 
movement from the safety zone includes the injured and the task force team, the two 
medics and the two officers. Iselin and Smith note, “Based on daily staffing in Arlington 
County, a total of seven RTFs can be formed at any time, each equipped to carry enough 
supplies to treat up to 14 victims, depending on their injuries.”203 
In an article by Ryan Greenberg, he discusses a meeting hosted by DHS that 
discussed a number of the issues above. He also mentions that local agencies are 
concerned about protective equipment the EMS personnel had available when entering 
into a warm/hot zone to initiate the treatment of the wounded with the task force. Per the 
article,  
Agencies across the United States have different approaches to this, 
ranging from those that send medical providers into the warm zone with 
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no additional personal protective equipment to those that have fitted their 
staff with personal body armor and ballistic helmets.204  
Potential solutions and their inherent questions range from personal carry to a “cache” 
carried in a supervisor vehicle with a generic, one-size-fits-all to the cost of the items and 
whose budget (police or fire) gets touched for the items? 
Concerning a possible answer to some of the equipment concerns, the Arlington 
Task Force provides adjustable Level IIIA tactical vests with Molle webbing that have 
the fire department (FD) logo on them as well as a rescue task force patch. Additionally, 
the teams also have a Level IIIA ballistic helmet. Built into to the ICS component, 
Arlington also has a logistics supply on scene for additional supplies as need for the task 
force personnel. 
Smith and Iselin conclude in their article, “Toward the Sound of Shooting:”  
Risk is nothing new for us; every day, we risk our lives to save people 
from dangerous situations, doing it with a safety net of protocols, training 
and equipment. The Rescue Task Force concept does the same, using a 
safety net to move fire/EMS to a new standard.205 
F. MULTI-ASSAULT COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION CAPABILITIES 
I shall mention the Multi-Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities 
(MACTAC) program only briefly in this paper and only as a further tactic to be 
considered within the context of multiple locations and multiple attackers as it was 
designed to combat incidents such as the Mumbai, India incident. This tactic is a 
consideration for future incidents and should be considered along with a response 
strategy that will incorporate the medical aspect discussed in this paper. 
As a result of the 2008 incident in Mumbai, India in which teams of terrorists 
attacked multiple locations in the city, law enforcement began looking for ways to 
combat simultaneous, multiple location attacks. The Mumbai attack occurred in 10 
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locations throughout the city and resulted with 164 people dead, at least 308 wounded, 
and millions of dollars of property damage. The attacks began on November 26 and 
lasted until November 29. 
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is known as one of the most 
innovative agencies in the United States, if not in the world. It developed the MACTAC 
program in conjunction with Las Vegas Police Department. The MACTAC project is 
“developing doctrine to improve our readiness to respond to, and defend the City from 
attacks similar to that recently experienced in Mumbai (LAPD, 2009).”206 Deputy Chief 
Michael P. Downing was given the task of creating a program to counteract a Mumbai 
style attack in the city and surrounding area. According to an article by Sandeep Joshi: 
The MACTAC programme (sic) provides the LAPD with the ability to 
provide high-impact squads that will respond to multiple, simultaneous 
critical incidents in Los Angeles and the surrounding area...It provides for 
cross-training and training with other agencies.207  
MACTAC has been introduced across the country and presentations have been made to 
“64 police departments.”208  
The LAPD believes that the MACTAC program can be a game changer with 
regard to a multiple location/offender attack. The department states, “The momentum of a 
MACTAC event can be significantly reduced within the first 30 minutes of the 
incident.”209 LAPD indicates that its response teams consist of  
contact teams, squads and mobile field forces. Four to seven officers make 
up a contact team. Three contact teams make up a squad and four squads 
                                                 
206 Los Angeles Police Department, “Chief’s Message,” Los Angeles Police Department, April 2009, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/search_results/content_basic_view/41809.  
207 Sandeep Joshi, “U.S. Police Provide Training to Thwart 26/11-type Attacks,” The Hindu, January 
20, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/us-police-provide-training-to-thwart-2611type-attacks/
article5594328.ece.  
208 Ibid.  
209 Los Angeles Police Department, “Planning for a Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action 
Capabilities (MACTAC) Incident,” TACOPS Newsletter, 6, no. 4 (October 2011): 1, 3, 5, 
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/130/130508_October%202011%20TacOps.pdf.  
102 
make up a mobile field force. Contact teams may be involved in assault, 
rescue, support or protection based missions.210 
Shortly after the attacks on 9-11 in New York and Washington, New York Police 
Department (NYPD) Commissioner Ray Kelly initiated a program that has expanded to 
include NYPD personnel assigned to foreign governments to assist in the sharing of 
intelligence and information. One of Commissioner Kelly’s initiatives under the 
Counterterrorism Unit was the creation of Hercules teams. These are fast deploying 
teams of heavily armed police officers that are able to respond anywhere in the five 
boroughs in minutes. Also in direct response to the Mumbai attacks, Kelly assigned more 
personnel to assist the emergency service units (ESU). According to Jackson, “Officers 
from the Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) were chosen to receive additional 
training in the event of a coordinated attack on multiple locations….”211 
As stated earlier in this paper, as part of the research design, from August 13–26, 
2013, I sent a formal request to clerks in 60 cities or counties for both law enforcement 
and fire/EMS polices regarding active shooter response. I did not request, nor did I 
receive any tactical plans. The selected jurisdictions were randomly picked and have 
population ranges (per the 2013 U.S. Census Bureau) of 17,828 to 1,257,676 for 55 cities 
and 206,353 to 1,372,171 for three counties. The remaining two agencies were interstate 
transportation-based, one on the east coast and one nationally. Both of these agencies had 
policies on active shooters. 
Table 7 shows the results of the requests. I do not include the list of the agencies 
believing that agencies that have or do not have policies need not be disclosed. The date I 
received the information back is considered non-applicable in that the answer was for 
tracking purposes only. For the purpose of this information, I either did or did not receive 
an answer.  
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Table 7.   Active shooter information requests 







     
8/13–26/2014 11 4 8 41 
 
 
As can be seen from the data, four agencies not only had their own policies but 
also had a combined policy for interaction with police and fire responders. Of the 60 
requests sent out, I received information that 11 agencies (police or fire) had a current 
active shooter policy while eight agencies (police or fire) did not have an active shooter 
policy. Forty-one agencies did not respond. I specifically did not request information on 
policies from the 10 historic locations used in this paper, yet one city did provide the 
police policy unsolicited. However, in the course of requesting historic information on 
the specific cases used, I did have two agencies provide me answers on the three 
questions. Their information is included in the 60 and listed as a request. 
This chapter has reviewed some of the response models for training and actual 
field use that have been developed and are in use around the United States. It is only 
through such sharing efforts that agencies and jurisdictions can initiate, grow, and learn 
from other responders. The next chapter also looks at the command and control model 
based on the Incident Command System. It includes a brief look at the history and at one 
application used to incorporate a joint unified command system. The joint unified 
command is the key as it allows the various responders to fill the tasks required for a 
response where it seems like everyone is showing up to help. 
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VIII. COMMAND AND CONTROL FROM CHAOS 
What I call Platonicity, after the ideas (and personality) of the philosopher 
Plato, is our tendency to mistake the map for the territory, to focus on pure 
and well-defined “forms,” whether objects, like triangles, or social 
notions, like utopias (societies built according to some blueprint of what 
“makes sense”), even nationalities.  
— Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
 
We begin this chapter with a quote from Dr. Taleb that focuses on our “tendency” 
or what may be known as the “we always did it this/that way” fallacy. We seem to want 
to respond and plan based on what was, rather than what will be. Heuer refers to this as:  
Mirror Image—filling gaps in the analyst’s own knowledge by assuming 
that the other side is likely to act in a certain way because it is how the 
U.S. would act in similar circumstances. It is an “everyone thinks like us” 
mindset.212  
It may be very safe to say that history has demonstrated that some sort of 
command and control structure has always been in place. This can be demonstrated from 
the hunter/gatherers to a modern warfare. It is also safe to say that even in the most 
disorganized event that some sort of a command and control function falls into place. 
Someone becomes the leader; someone hunts, protects, attacks, or carries out some sort 
of plan; someone makes a plan; someone tends to the supplies and makes sure there are 
sufficient things for the village, tribe, or army; and someone makes sure that there is a 
way to keep tabs on everything. From planning a battle to planning a vacation or 
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According to TriData Division:  
There are five components to the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), including preparedness, communications and information 
management, resource management, command and management, and 
ongoing management and maintenance. An ICS is part of NIMS.213  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive # 5 (HSPD 5) mandates the creation of the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). “At the national level, both HSPDs 5 
and 8 require all federal, state, regional, local, and tribal governments to adopt the NIMS, 
including a uniform ICS.”214  
Referring back to my 2009 thesis, I provide an explanation for the NIMS: 
The purpose of the NIMS is to provide a comprehensive and efficient 
method of all entities working together utilizing a common plan. This 
system addresses events and incidents of any size, cause, or complexity by 
providing a set of principles, concepts, technology and terminology that 
will be consistent nationally. Additionally, the system indicates the use of 
an ICS, which is consists of the command staff, including the incident 
commander, a public information officer, a liaison officer (for information 
flow to other responding agencies), and a safety officer. Under the 
command staff is the general staff, which consists of the operations 
section, the planning section, the logistics section, and the finance/admin 
section. The plan also calls for the ability of multi-agencies to work in a 
unified command as well as the training to accomplish these goals. In her 
paper for the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Deirdre Walker 
points out that prior to 9/11 the law enforcement side of the response team 
normally, “…had no interaction with fire, public works or public 
health.”215 This plan can be expanded from the basic ICS structure above 
to include additional responding stakeholders and agencies to address that 
very issue. It is important to understand that the ICS structure is to be 
considered self-sustaining in its response. That is, the ICS responders have 
a logistics section capable of providing for the needs of the responders and 
are separate from the emergency operations centers emergency support 
function.216  
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A. INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
In planned events or unexpected incidents there should be a system of controls for 
the various tasks that need to be determined and accomplished. As shall be shown in the 
following chapter there is a command and control system available to address such a 
needed structure—the Incident Command System (ICS).    
1. History 
The ICS has been formally adopted in the mid-1970s by the California Wildfire 
community under a program called FireScope. I offer a concise explanation of the 
capabilities under ICS in my 2009 thesis: 
The main function of the system is its flexibility, its use of 
compartmentalized “sections” for command and control, and its 
performance of specific “functions” to accomplish an overall mission. ICS 
has tremendous strength in its ability to expand and contract as needed—
adding and deleting assets as necessary for an operation. The adaptability 
of ICS is such that it can be used to plan weddings, vacations, and 
responses to natural and man-made disasters as well as planned events, 
such as sports or holiday gatherings. Certain diehards believe that this 
system is an adapted version of the command and control system 
originally established by the military to address command, personnel, 
training, intelligence, and logistics.217 
ICS is established on a formal command structure divided into two areas, one is the 
command staff and the other is the general staff. The command staff consists of the 
following: 
The Incident Commander has overall responsibility for managing the 
incident. The Incident Commander must be fully briefed and should have 
a written delegation of authority. Initially, assigning tactical resources and 
overseeing operations will be under the direct supervision of the Incident 
Commander.  
Public Information Officer, who serves as the conduit for information to 
internal and external stakeholders, including the media or other 
organizations seeking information directly from the incident or event.  
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Safety Officer, who monitors safety conditions and develops measures for 
assuring the safety of all assigned personnel.  
Liaison Officer, who serves as the primary contact for supporting agencies 
assigned to an incident.218 
The next portion of the ICS organization is the general staff for the field personnel 
consisting of the following: 
Operations Section Chief (OPS) responsible for the tactical operations in 
the field and the resources needed.  
Logistics Section Chief (LSC), who is responsible for having, maintaining 
and providing resources and services which include needed supplies and 
equipment as well as ordering items that are not on hand, to include 
additional personnel (assets) and equipment (resources) as well as the 
feeding and care of the responders.  
Planning Section Chief (PSC) who is responsible for collecting and 
analyzing information, tracking all the resources, compiling and storing 
the documentation.  
Finance/Administration Section Chief (FSC) who is in essence the bean 
counter and is responsible for expenditures, any claims made and any 
compensation.219 
Within each of these sections are smaller components, as needed, which serve to 
function toward the higher section needs. Figure 11 denotes a basic ICS command and 
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 ICS command and general officers organizational chart Figure 11. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, IS-100.B: Introduction. 
The confusion of responders, or what can be considered the “fog of war,” appears 
to have been demonstrated as a possible issue at the Aurora, Colorado, theater shooting. 
According to Murphy and Crummy:  
But the dispatch recordings indicate there remained an information 
disconnect between the fire commander on scene outside and police in the 
theater… police knew they had several bodies in the theater and scores of 
patients across the property who needed transport to hospitals or were 
already on their way in police cars… But a fire commander on the scene 
estimated at the same time there were just 20 patients throughout the scene 
who would need hospitalization. “I’m just trying to sort it out right,” the 
unidentified commander said. “I hear 10 here, four here. I’m going to go 
with 20 right now. Let’s just go with 20 people until we get this 
verified.”220 
2. Application 
During a response of the nature and size of an active shooter incident, command 
and control becomes the critical linchpin for a successful operation. With the countless 
tasks that must be performed during the response, command and control focuses the 
responders by giving them purpose and direction. It provides commanders the ability to 
make the most of what they have on scene and when responding to assist. It also provides 
them the opportunity to plan for future needs to support their operation. The term 
“command” and the term “control” are two distinct items. Command is the direction that 
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is provided by the incident commander down to subordinates to accomplish objectives. 
According to the U.S. Marine Corp, “Control takes the form of feedback—the continuous 
flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander….”221 To 
be executed properly, the process must be interactive with a “push” concept for the 
information and the decisions. In other words, both ends must push information back and 
forth to each other rather than one having to “pull” it from the other. Perhaps now, the 
phrase “lost control” makes more sense if we replace the word control with the word 
“information”—the commander has lost information or situational awareness.  
Three slides, Figures 11, 12, and 13, which were used to instruct a portion of the 
active shooter training at the West Palm Beach Police Department, can be used to 
illustrate the response needs for arriving and follow-on units. The information contained 
in the slides is from me and compiled with information from conversations from various 
trainers, other agency personnel, and readings of incidents and professional publications 
as well as classes taught and attended. As the slides are presented and the discussion for 
the shooting scenario is made, it is important to remember that this teaching is for a one-
shooter incident, not a multi-shooter incident. In the event of multiple shooters, such as in 
Mumbai, each incident becomes its own area of responsibility. Multiple venues can and 
should be controlled with a single incident commander in what has now become a 
“complex” operation, which is described as “…any system composed of multiple parts, 
each of which must act individually according to its own circumstances and which, by so 
acting changes the circumstances affecting all other parts.”222 Another definition can be 
found in a paper that was written by Snowden and Boone in November 2007 for the 
Harvard Business. In part,  
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A complex system has the following characteristics: 
• It involves large numbers of interacting elements. 
• The interactions are nonlinear, and minor changes can produce 
disproportionately major consequences. 
• The system is dynamic, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and 
solutions can’t be imposed; rather, they arise from the circumstances. This 
is frequently referred to as emergence. 
• The system has a history, and the past is integrated with the present; the 
elements evolve with one another and with the environment; and evolution 
• Is irreversible. 
• Though a complex system may, in retrospect, appear to be ordered and 
predictable, hindsight does not lead to foresight because the external 
conditions and systems constantly change. 
• Unlike in ordered systems (where the system constrains the agents), or 
chaotic systems (where there are no constraints), in a complex system the 
agents and the system constrain one another, especially over time. This 
means that we cannot forecast or predict what will happen.223 
In this case, per ICS planning, an area command is proper and most effective in such 
situations. 
Using Figure 12 as a reference, in all emergency responses it is critical that the 
responding units arrive safely; this cannot be stressed enough. If one does not show up, 
one is of no help, and this may even pull resources away from the scene. Officers should 
stay off the radio once units advise that they are responding to keep the radio open for 
command and control information. In some instances, responders may be directed to 
another channel or in-service units may be moved to another channel. This is done to 
keep the communications net available to mitigate the situation. In fact, multiple channels 
may be incorporated for different functions.  
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 First responding units Figure 12. 
Active Shooters and ICS
First Responding Units
Arrive Safely
Keep the radio open 
Control the radio
Enter the site – tell dispatch who and where
Safely, tactically, rapid approach (Sudden, 
Speed, Violence of Action)
Mitigate the threat – eliminate or contain
Secure what you have – this is the Hot Zone
 
 
Once on-scene, advise dispatch and make entry into the scene toward the sound of 
gunfire or into the chaos. It is critical that responding officers utilize safety and tactics as 
they enter and get close to the shooter(s). The military and tactical teams refer to the 
initiation of suppression of a shooter as sudden (or surprise), swiftly, and with violence of 
action. There can be no hesitation in moving to contain an active shooter; the purpose is 
to stop the harm for more potential victims. This is done in one of two ways: eliminate 
the threat or contain the threat. Once the shooter is neutralized or contained in a certain 
area, this is now established the hot zone. 
As seen in Figure 13, the second responding units will perform a number of tasks. 
Some units may be needed to respond to the shooter or additional shooters as needed. 
Their protocol will be the same as the first responding units. Eventually, control of the 
scene will become necessary. The secondary units must understand that there is a great 
deal of resources on the way. They will need to be managed and directed to best assist 
with control of the scene. Law enforcement, fire, and most of the field responders should 
be comfortable with the concept of hot, warm, and cold zones to designate the location. 
All additional responders will need to be directed as to where they are needed so the 
establishment of a warm and cold zone is very important. It is also at this time that the 
various commanders for the responding entities come together to form a unified 
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command to better control the situation. Based on my experience, commanders have a 
pressing need to be in close where the action is. It is important that the incident 
commanders are located away from the immediate scene as best as possible and let their 
field commanders do their jobs. If they are trained properly and together, this should not 
be a problem. If they are not performing, they should be replaced. Arriving units must be 
notified where casualty collection points are located so they can be staffed and secured. 
They also need to know where witnesses are being collected so they can be tended to and 
isolated for protection and interviewing. Units need to know where the perimeter is 
located and where additional units arriving can be staged and called into service as 
needed. It is important that commanders take into account the proper utilization of the 
various responding agencies. Commanders should task an agency to handle a particular 
assignment, such as medical transport and patient accountability, triage assistance, 
security sweeps for other dangers, perimeter control, staging area control, and traffic 
control points. Commanders should remember that the responders may need medical 
assistance. 
 Second responding units Figure 13. 
Active Shooters and ICS
The location is the initial hot zone
 large outside cold perimeter
 inside warm perimeter
Collect victims from the site -CCP’s
Locate the FD Cmdr for Unified Command
Vehicle access/egress points for PD, FD, Etc
Collect witnesses from the site







Figure 14 illustrates with the use of incident command and additional 
responsibilities that will be needed at a minimum. Mutual aid from responding 
communities may be an automatic response or may need to be requested due to 
memorandums of understandings (MOUs). Pre-planning for large incidents or even 
routine events such as fairs, concerts, or parades may also require MOUs. Palm Beach 
County, Florida has located within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) a “county 
warning point.” All municipalities and other agencies in the county are directed to alert 
the EOC warning point of issues, routine or emergent, so that assets or resources (people 
and equipment) can be requested as needed. All entities within the county are then alerted 
of the situation for their awareness. The initial notification is made via dispatch to the 
warning point with continuous updates as needed. Incident commanders must also be 
aware that there may be a need off site for personnel; again, this is a tasking that can be 
given to other responding jurisdictions. Such sites may include the various receiving 
hospitals, media locations as directed by the public information officer (PIO), family 
assembly areas, and other locations. 
 Follow-on responding units Figure 14. 
Active Shooters and ICS
Follow-on Responding Units
• ICS / Unified Command continues
• Request Mutual Aid
• Contact the County Warning Point
• Establish ICS locations
• CP, PIO, Staging, 
• Receive other responding units
• Receive assisting agencies
• Protect the hospitals
• Coordinate victim pick-ups at off-site location
• Coordinate an off-site, secure the site,
• Prepare for the media, parents, spouses, friends, politicians, 
bosses
• volunteers, nice guys, helpful people
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B. COMBINED RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
The fate of the wounded lays with those who apply the first dressing.  
— Col. Nicholas Senn, MD, 1844–1908  
 
Nancy Rigg writes in her article about the North Hollywood bank shootout that 
chaos ruled as command and control was almost nonexistent. She explains:   
LeChasse’s first order of business was command and control. “I tried to do 
a little of that en route by using the radio,” he said, “but there was so much 
traffic on the North Hollywood frequency, I couldn’t get through. I tried 
the tactical frequency they were on to identify who the incident 
commander was, but there wasn’t one at the time.” The incident, which 
escalated at each turn, had drawn everyone into the fray, with no one 
trying to “pull all of the parts together.”224 
Recent history has shown that the attacks that law enforcement and fire/EMS are 
responding to are becoming more complex or “hybrid targeted violence.”225 Imagine if 
the propane tanks at Columbine had exploded in the cafeteria and in Klebold’s car in the 
parking lot. Recall the ambush attack of firefighters in Webster, New York on December 
24, 2012 or the explosive booby trap in the Aurora, Colorado shooters apartment. These 
are some of the scenarios that responders have may face in the future. Frazzano and 
Snyder speak of this, “firefighters may need to fight fires in a ‘hot zone’ while a sniper is 
at large—or the EMS medics need to render ‘care under fire,’ and police officers may 
need to confront the threat of fire used as a weapon against them.”226 No longer can we 
rely on decision making based solely on the past; this heuristic becomes a “best guess or 
                                                 
224 Nancy J. Rigg, “From the Archives: Shoot-Out in North Hollywood: Command and 
Communications,” 9-1-1 Magazine, July 23, 2012, http://www.9-1-1magazine.com/Archives-9709-Rigg-
North-Hollywood-Shootout.  
225 Tracy L. Frazzano, and G. Matthew Snyder, “A Paradigm Shift for First Responders: Preparing the 
Emergency Response Community for Hybrid Targeted Violence,” The Police Chief 80, no. 5 (May 2013): 
36.  
226 Ibid.  
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a method of decision making based on past experience.”227 According to a report by 
TriData Division:  
There also needs to be better training of fire and EMS personnel for 
entering a warm danger zone under police protection. Another 
consideration is to train police officers in basic combat medic skills, and 
provide them with a tactical medical kit, which Aurora police now are 
doing.228 
With just the three scenarios above, it becomes plain that the use of participatory 
action research and meetings by both disciplines in a collective process can address 
problems of these types. In Ernest Stringer’s book, he provides a solution:  
One of the strengths of action research is that it accepts the diverse 
perspectives of different stakeholders—the “theory” each will hold to 
explain how and why events occur as they do—and finds ways of 
incorporating them into mutually acceptable ways of understanding events 
that enable them to work toward a resolution of the problem 
investigated.229  
With joint meetings, training, and exercises occurring before incidents the option 
of creating a policy and sets of procedures for cooperatively dealing with incidents 
becomes easier. In Jack Matson’s book, Innovate or Die, he speaks of “intelligent fast 
failure.” To paraphrase this concept as one of creating ideas or innovations (intelligent) 
and putting them to use either in reality or in a scenario-based situation.230 The idea is to 
permit the failures to occur as quickly as possible (fast failure) and modify the concept 
and create an intelligent design that is sustainable and growable to be able to update as 
needed. Done over time, in a combined, cooperative setting the participants and decision 
makers have the benefit of remaining focused on the big picture. In their piece for 
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Drs. Tang and Kelen commented, “It 
is unlikely that any single component of the public safety infrastructure will be able to 
effectively and comprehensively respond to those threats posed and casualties inflicted 
                                                 
227 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 41.   
228 TriData Division, Aurora Century Theater Shooting, xiv.  
229 Stringer, Action Research, 39.  
230 Jack V. Matson, Innovate or Die (Royal Oak, MI: Paradigm Press Ltd, 1996).  
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during a hostile mass casualty shooting incident.”231 This is demonstrated in Figure 15, 
which shows a typical response organization for a large incident. According to the U.S. 
Fire Administration: 
Usually police resources in the initial moments of AS/MCIs are focused 
on locating, containing and eliminating the threat, thus the local fire/EMS 
resources should emphasize planning for rapid triage, treatment and 
extrication of the wounded.232 














Source: George Williams, “Combined Rapid Response” (presentation at the Boca Raton 
Police Department, Boca Raton, FL, 2013).  
During a 2013 presentation for local police command staff on combined rapid 
response, at the Boca Raton, Florida police department, George Williams of Cutting Edge 
Training pointed out that typical law enforcement and fire responses to a scene was 
                                                 
231 Tang, and Gabor, “Role of Tactical EMS Support,” S56.  
232 U.S. Fire Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire/Emergency, 9.  
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generally set up with a discipline specific command structure, as seen in Figure 16.233 
Police has its corner, fire has theirs, and never the twain shall meet. Using a PowerPoint 
slide, Williams demonstrated what he saw as the organizational chart for such 
responses.234 As expected, there was not a lot of disagreement.  


















Source: Williams, “Combined Rapid Response.” 
Williams then reviewed the components of the basic slide for each discipline and 
then put up a second slide, Figure 15, a very basic combined resource slide that better 
demonstrates the need and the expectations for a unified command operation.235 What is 
not shown are the other sections in a typical ICS organizational chart—liaison, safety, 
planning, logistics, and admin/finance.  
For the Aurora Theater shooting, Figure 17 shows the organizational chart that 
was used in the after action report to the governor. It shows a basic layout for the 
                                                 
233 George Williams, “Combined Rapid Response” (presentation at the Boca Raton Police 
Department, Boca Raton, FL, 2013).  
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid.  
119 
responders and includes the staging area for arriving units so that they do not overwhelm 
the scene and are used as needed and appropriately. Also in the chart are the three major 
branches utilized: the EMS, law enforcement, and hazmat. These are functional groups 
designed to do a specific task. Once operational, they can be sub-divided within ICS 
standards  
 Aurora AAR ICS chart Figure 17. 
 
Source: TriData Division, Aurora Century Theater Shooting, 108.  
An additional consideration that must be taken into account because it will happen 
is the sheer number of agencies and personnel that will descend upon the incident. 
Consider Table 8, culled from the after action reports.  
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Table 8.   Assets and resources 
 
 
Perhaps now would be a good time to recall the Cynefin diagram from Figure 5 
from Snowden, this time (see Figure 18) in a more relaxed format. The response to an 
active shooter incident falls into the left, the chaotic quadrant of the diagram—in chaos. 
There is no recognizable pattern, no rhyme or reason to what is occurring. The after 
action reports for the historic shooting incidents clearly indicate that this is to be 
expected. The response priority is to “act” at this time, the primary objective is to 
neutralize the threat, to stop the bleeding, while at the same time begin to receive 
additional units with some sort of control, deal with the fleeing people and attempt to 
make some sense out of what is happening. The ultimate goal is to push back through the 
“complex” quadrant where the mind is probing and searching for the familiar. Although 
they do exist and demand answers, concepts and issues are emerging quickly without 
quickly recognized pattern. It is imperative that decision makers at all levels strive to 
 Assets and Resources 
 Columbine Aurora Newtown 
On Duty 
 
LE - not 
available 
FD - ~ 32 
LE -126 
FD - not available 
LE -10 init. responders 









FD—Newtown 60 vols 






112 initially 400 + ofcs initially 









9 Engs, Tks, 
Towers 
24 Newtown volunteers 
No other information 
Patients 160 triaged 
24 transported 
~ 82 triaged 
60 transported 
4 triaged  
4 transported 
Hospitals 6 7 1 
Man Hrs 
needed 
Not Available Not Available 10,000 security alone 
19,200 ($1.27 million, 
$722,000 for CT S.P.) 
Mail Not Available Not Available App. 200,000 pieces 
Volunteers Not Available Not Available 580 registered 
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push through the complex domain and regain the complicated domain as fast as possible. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) David Grossman, “Very little innovative 
thinking occurs under combat conditions, we must plan and train for the next fight before 
we’re in it.”236  
 Cynefin Figure 18. 
 
Source Snowden, and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 1.   
It is here that commanders and supervisors run the risk of falling back on the “we 
always did it this way” answers rather than move forward with new answers to the new 
issues and the emerging patterns. DeBono refers to this thinking process as pattern 
making and explains it as, “The minds process in which incoming data gets organized 
into a pattern. Unless there are competing patterns, then anything remotely similar to the 
established pattern will be treated just as if it were that pattern.”237 
From the complex in the Cynefin diagram, it is important to move toward the 
right hand “complicated” quadrant or what Snowden and Boone refer to in their article 
                                                 
236 Richard Fairburn, and David Grosman, “Preparing for School Attacks,” Killology Research Group, 
accessed February 12, 2016, http://www.killology.com/schoolattack.htm.  
237 Edward DeBono, DeBono’s Thinking Course (New York: Facts on File, 1994), 42.  
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as, “The Domain of Experts.”238 This is where the response phase fits better with the 
planning phase. It is from pre-training meetings; training, and working together that 
issues develop into “systems thinking” based on and built from the responders training in 
their particular disciplines. The term “lateral thinking” comes into play and is explained 
by DeBono as “… a neutral process. It is an appreciation that any way of looking at 
things is only one among many possible ways.”239 Another simple way that I understand 
this process is rather than remain on the road or with the organizational thought processes 
that can be used, go off-road in the thinking process to discover different routes toward 
the goal. 
While in this “complicated” quadrant, the responders and the supervisors should 
be relying on the analysis of the incident and responding as well as planning to return to a 
level above the basics with a reliance on training and experience. Barrett and Fry explain 
this idea in Appreciative Inquiry, “It is assumed that a basic level of normal function 
exists in any organization, and that the potential—or capacity—for exceptional 
performance is already embedded within the organization.”240 In very simplistic terms, 
cops do cop stuff, firefighters do fire stuff, and EMS people do EMS stuff.  
The professionals who respond to chaotic scenes eventually develop into pattern 
thinking, which is not, in most cases, a bad thing. Referring back to Colonel Boyd and his 
OODA loop, he realized that the winner in an air combat dogfight most often was the 
pilot that could think faster than the opponent thinks, or one that could decide on a course 
of action and then initiate the action. Responders must be able to arrive on scene, then 
observe, orient to the incident, decide on a course of action, and act. It is necessary that 
the four portions of the loop be correct each time. This process is repeated as quickly and 
often as needed (see Figure 19).  
                                                 
238 Snowden, and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 3.  
239 DeBono, DeBono’s Thinking Course, 70.  
240 Barrett, and Fry, Appreciative Inquiry, 19.  
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 OODA loop Figure 19. 
 
Source: Patrick Edwin Moran, “Unlocking the Power of Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop,” 
April 28, 2015, Pogo, http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/
military-people-and-their-ideas/2015/unlocking-the-power-of-john-boyd-ooda-loop.html.  
The final component for the interaction between the law enforcement responders 
and the fire/EMS is the ability to take subsections of each discipline and combine them 
into a rescue task force (RTF). In ICS vernacular, as noted before, a task force is created 
by combining different resources into a single team working together to complete a 
tasking.  
Dr. Robert Eastman, speaking at the 2013 IACP conference in Philadelphia, noted 
that at the Hartford Consensus of 2013, it was found that there are viable solutions to 
address the issues of active shootings. The participants at the Hartford meeting came up 
with an acronym of “THREAT” to easily process through an incident: 
• Threat suppression—using current department standards 
• Hemorrhage control 
• Rapid extrication to safety 
• Assessment by medical providers 
• Transport to definitive care241 
The final figure from the Cutting Edge Technology presentation (Figure 20) 
demonstrates an exclusion zone, safe triage area established within the hot zone. Trained 
                                                 
241 Joint Committee, Improving Survival from Active Shooter Events.  
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law enforcement officers escort trained medical personnel into this triage area where the 
EMS personnel perform their task as the law enforcement personnel provide security. 
The team enters together and any injured civilians are prioritized and escorted out with 
medics and security. The task force returns to the exclusion zone with more supplies to 
continue the mission. The RTF also becomes a casualty collection point for other victims 
that are located inside the hot zone. 








Redefine to the Police the 
meaning of  “Life Safety”
Not just about shooting but 
also about getting to and 
protecting the victims
 Tactically trained medics
Medical treatment needs to 
begin within the “Platinum 10
minutes” of the trauma
 Dedicated team of officers 
provide security for medics, 
Hot zone team, triage, CCP
 
Source: Williams, “Combined Rapid Response.”  
Arlington County, Virginia has developed such a plan. The concept is simple but 
requires practice with the RTF elements. The beauty to such a plan is that if the course 
curriculum remains the same, every member of the law enforcement and fire/EMS 
communities can go through the training and to participate collectively in an incident 
regardless of with whom they trained.  
A sample from the Arlington policy states: 
The Arlington, VA RTF plan for activation is simple. In the event that 
there is an active shooter incident: 
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• the first four or five responding police officers quickly form an initial 
contact team and enter the building; this is the standard police response...  
• contact team moves quickly to the sound of the shooter, and relay 
important reconnaissance information back to command…  
• the RTF is formed with two police officers…two medics…move into the 
building…242 
With a small team configuration, a number of RTF teams can be deployed 
over a large area. Command and control remains with the law enforcement 
side; however, each medic team will be in communications directly to an 
EMS command to be able to relay information and receive instructions. 
The individual teams operate as one with entry and evacuation done intact. 
As additional teams are formed, they may venture further into the scene 
and …with the primary mission of evacuating the remaining stabilized 
victims. They can also be tasked to move further into the building in a 
“stabilizing but not evacuating” mode to take over for the initial RTF 
teams that have run out of supplies and begun evacuation.243 
Therefore, we find that we have returned to a position of action research in 
cooperatively planning for the various incidents that may occur and specifically for mass 
casualty events that involve an active shooter component. To return to action research we 
look again at one of its basic core statements,  
One of the strengths of action research is that it accepts the diverse 
perspectives of different stakeholders—the “theory” each will hold to 
explain how and why events occur as they do—and finds ways of 
incorporating them into mutually acceptable ways of understanding events 
that enable them to work toward a resolution of the problem 
investigated.244  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
This chapter covered three areas: ICS and its history, the application of ICS, and 
the application of a combined response to an active shooter incident. In the latter, it 
examined the concept of Cynefin again and the OODA loop for decision making and 
action dominance. In addition, it included creating an exclusion zone within the hot zone 
for medical personnel to begin their triage and scene evacuation for treatment and 
                                                 
242 Smith, and Iselin, and Blake; 53.  
243 Ibid., 54.   
244 Stringer, Action Research, 38.  
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transport. In addition, the chapter briefly examined the 2013 Hartford Consensus, which 
provided a number of guidelines for how to respond to an active shooter and the initial 
first aid demands will present themselves to the responders. Finally, it returned to the 
concept of participatory action research as a way to continue to develop response plans 
and procedures based on input from lessons learned around the country and within 
interdisciplinary meetings that can provide a level platform for local responders to 
develop plans. 
The next chapter begins to close with concluding recommendations. It starts with 
the initial search for information from various jurisdictions and review that response for 
information. Next, it looks at the policies that were delivered and glean from them any 




The purpose of this thesis was to investigate and determine an answer to the 
research question, how can a combined law enforcement (LE) and emergency medical 
services (EMS) response based on combat medical care be effective in saving lives 
during an active shooter incident? The daily news, both worldwide and local, is not 
lacking stories of mass injuries from natural disasters or manmade incidents. This paper 
looks at a very narrow threat environment, active shooters. Our new worldwide 
environment demonstrates incidents of explosives, lone wolf attacks, targeting of first 
responders, and small unit tactics for the advancement of terror. If this new threat 
consideration is to be coupled with our old threat environment (e.g., transportation 
accidents, explosions, natural disasters, environmental disasters, manmade disasters), it is 
absolutely critical that the issue of team responses to such incidents be brought to the 
forefront. 
In his paper, Heuer, states:   
Conceptually driven analysis is on the opposite end of the spectrum from 
data-driven analysis. The questions to be answered do not have neat 
boundaries and there are many unknowns. The outcome of the analysis 
depends at least as much upon the conceptual framework employed to 
analyze the data as it does upon the data itself. Interpretation is based upon 
an implicit mental model of how and why events normally transpire in the 
area for which the analyst is responsible.245 
It is the primarily responsibility of the government to protect its people. To such an end, 
we have legislation and directives published. The National Preparedness Goal directs 
that our purpose, that of the government and we the citizens, is to address these issues 
through published core capabilities. These capabilities become the foundation for the five 
mission areas of “prevent, protect, mitigation, response, recovery.” 246  It is vitally 
important that we, the citizens, remember “all emergencies/disasters are local.” It is the 
duty of the local government to respond to incidents within its jurisdiction; it will be the 
                                                 
245 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 60.  
246 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goals.  
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first to the incident and the last to leave. Therefore, it becomes the responsibility of that 
jurisdiction to be able to meet the four phases of emergency management—mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. When something is mitigated, it is made less 
severe by lessening its impact. In the instance of mass casualty incidents, such as an 
active shooter, this is accomplished by a state of readiness or preparedness. We move 
toward or become prepared by understanding the threats, by being aware, and by training 
to meet these threats.  
As has been demonstrated in this thesis, incidents do occur, and procedures have 
been and are still  being developed and modified on a daily basis to address these attacks 
on our safety. In addition, areas that were typically separated by responder disciplines are 
becoming mixed and merged. Where once we had no formal way of responding to active 
shooters, we now have SWAT teams. Where once we had no medical capabilities on 
these teams, we now have SWAT medics. Where once we waited for the SWAT 
operation to conclude, we now have rescue task forces composed of law enforcement and 
medical personnel capable of operating in a hot zone. We have also seen the development 
of hasty medical treatment training for responding law enforcement based on the military 
model. Time is of the essence in active shooter incidents where civilians or responders 
are injured. The police and EMS/fire families have learned how to play together in the 
sand box to meet the needs of the citizens that each has sworn to protect. 
 
Greater love hath no man than this, 
 that a man lay down his life for his friends. 
 
— John 21:25 (KJV) 
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APPENDIX.  RESOURCES 
1. ALERRT Program at San Marcos, TX 
a. Level 1—battle first aid 
b. Level II—integrated AS into the training 
c. Hemorrhage control, airway 
 
2. Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (C-TECC), 19309 
Winmeade Drive, Suite 420, Leesburg, VA 20176 www.c-tecc.org; Co–
Chairs E. Reed Smith, MD, FACEP (rsmith@arlingtonva.us); and David 
W. Callaway, MD, MPA, FAAEM dcallawa@gmail.com 
3. International Board of Specialty Certification ((IBSC®), 4835 Riveredge 
Cove, Snellville, GA 30039 https://www.ibscertifications.org/ascerteon/
control/about/about-us 
4. Cutting Edge Training, 9 Cascade Lane, Bellingham, WA  98229  
http://www.cuttingedgetraining.org/;  George T. Williams 
5. FEMA/DHS course, IS-907:  Active Shooter: What You Can Do 
6. Hillsboro Fire Department, Hillsboro Oregon, The Rapid Response & 
Treatment Model (R2TM) free to all members of public safety and 
emergency management agencies; www.ffsupport.org 
7. National Fallen Firefighters Foundation; Firefighter Life Safety Initiative 
12; FEMA, January 2013 
a. Recommendations 
b. Appendix—Lexington, Kentucky SOP 200.48 Response to Violent 
or Potentially Violent Incidents  
8. Pierce County Sheriff’s Office, 930 Tacoma Ave. S. Tacoma, WA 98402 
PowerPoint—Active Shooter Response Options  
9. Pima County Sherriff’s Office, 1750 E. Benson Highway Tucson, AZ 
85714 - First Five Minutes program 
10. Puyallup Police Department, 311 W Pioneer, Puyallup WA 98371;  - 
Rescue Teams—Chief Bryan Jeter, IACP slides 
11. Rochester Police Department, 101 4th St SE, Rochester, MN 55902,  
Police Department Basic Tactical Casualty Care (BTCC) Course 





a. 10,000 law enforcement officers trained  
b. Free 
c. 2 days 
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